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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction: 
The Kashmir Conflict and Nuclear Danger 
 
“Imaginary histories strike a chord when they involve outcomes that we really don’t think 
will come about but still recognize as possible. Without the former condition these stories are 
redundant. Without the latter, they are just science fiction.” 
- Robert Jervis 
  
 3 
Situated at the intersection of the Pakistani, Indian, and Chinese border is a region called 
Kashmir, a stretch of land with beautifully diverse geography, ranging from the flowing 
waters of the Indus River to the highest peaks of the Himalayas to the fertile soil of the 
Kashmir Valley. The landscape of Kashmir is like something from a dream and yet the 
region has been shrouded in war, insurgency, and turmoil since the partition of the British 
Indian Empire, in 1947, when India and Pakistan first began the struggle to acquire the semi-
autonomous princely state. The Kashmir question has proved to be one of the most 
intractable and complicated issues in international politics.   
Since 1947, India and Pakistan have gone to war four times and faced several other 
regional crises over the disputed status of Kashmir, including the recent Pulwama crisis in 
February 2019. 1,125km of the Indo-Pakistan border runs through the disputed territory of 
Kashmir.1 The border delimiting Indian-controlled Kashmir from Pakistani controlled 
Kashmir is referred to as the Line of Control (LoC) and in 2017 India and Pakistan accused 
each other of a combined 2,860 ceasefire violations.2 Not only is Kashmir of the utmost 
importance to international scholars for the thousands of Kashmiri people displaced each 
year as a result of the Indo-Pakistani border dispute, but also for the conflict’s nuclear 
implications. In 1998, the Kashmir conflict took on a nuclear dimension when India and 
subsequently Pakistan acquired nuclear weapon capabilities. Since both nations weaponized, 
the Kashmir conflict has been characterized by increasingly aggressive nuclear rhetoric and 
signaling. Nuclear use by either India and Pakistan, even for counterforce targeting, would 
                                                        
1 Happymon Jacob, Line on Fire: Ceasefire Violations and India-Pakistan Escalation Dynamics, (Oxford 
University Press, 2019), 64. 
2 Jacob, Line on Fire, 148. 
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result in the deaths of millions on the continent and forever damage the taboo surrounding 
nuclear first-use.  
This paper will explore the ways in which the ongoing Indo-Pakistan conflict in 
Kashmir may escalate to the nuclear level. I will argue that a nuclear exchange between India 
and Pakistan, in reference to the Kashmir conflict, is within the realm of plausibility and 
therefore deserves careful consideration of which aspects of the Indo-Pakistani relationship 
are especially destabilizing for the continent. A vital distinction about this paper is that I will 
not argue a nuclear war will occur on the continent, nor will I make a prediction about the 
most likely pathway, but rather I argue a nuclear exchange could happen and therefore 
deserves scholarly attention. In the words of Robert Jervis, Kashmir’s nuclear dimension 
deserves study because a nuclear exchange is “neither certain nor impossible.” 3  
My argument will unfold in three stages. First, I will clarify the research method of 
scenario planning. Scenario planning seeks to illustrate “what could happen” in an effort to 
“energize people to make the effort necessary for it not to happen.”4 Chapter 2 will explain in 
detail the method of scenario planning and the specific organization of the scenarios I will 
craft. Next, I will summarize the major theories of nuclear escalation in Chapter 3. Escalation 
theory is vital to any understanding of how the subconventional conflict in Kashmir could 
escalate to the nuclear level. In the subsequent chapters (4, 5, and 6), I will analyze the 
history of Kashmir, as well as the military and nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan. My 
analysis will focus on extrapolating the aspects of the Indo-Pakistani relationship that 
contribute to the intensification of tensions in the Kashmiri region and may catalyze India or 
                                                        
3 Robert Jervis, review of The 2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks Against the 
United States: A Speculative Novel, by Jeffrey Lewis, War on the Rocks, (September 2018), 
https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/a-horrifying-and-believable-path-to-nuclear-war-with-north-korea/ 
4 Ibid.  
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Pakistan to employ a nuclear weapon. Chapter 7 will present four pathways to nuclear first-
use by India or Pakistan, the organization of which will be outlined in Chapter 2. The 
pathways will then be analyzed in the conclusion, Chapter 8, and I will highlight some policy 
implications stemming from my research.  
  
 6 
Chapter 2 
 
Research Method: 
Scenario Planning and Analysis  
  
 7 
The first step in our analysis is to define the research method of scenario planning. 
This will help guide the following chapters, which enable us to construct scenarios of nuclear 
first-use in South Asia. Furthermore, it will remove any confusion over the goals and 
purposes of imagining future crisis scenarios. Scenario planning is one of the techniques 
underpinning the research method of massive strategic planning, which uses a combination 
of human-intensive and computer model-intensive “exploration of the possibility of space” to 
generate futures for analysis.5 The term scenario planning first appeared in a RAND report in 
the 1960s, long before computers gave researchers the ability to generate scenarios in mass 
quantities.6 Massive Scenario generation uses both analytic thinking as well as computer 
generation to formulate up to hundreds of scenarios for the future. My research will utilize 
the analytic human-intensive part of the method to construct four distinct scenarios for 
conflict in South Asia that each lead to a nuclear first-use by India or Pakistan.  
First, it is vital to understand that scenarios are not predictions for the future or hard 
and fast rules for how a situation will play out. Scenarios are possibilities. They are a “logical 
and consistent picture of the future that is credible and challenging to stakeholders.”7 The 
main purpose of scenario planning is the expansion of possibilities. Scenarios, therefore, are 
not predictions about the future that constrain the scope of possibilities, but rather images 
that help to policy makers to think more broadly about the future, allowing greater flexibility 
in the event of a crisis. Scenarios should not leave the reader “with a sense of inevitability,” 
                                                        
5 “Enhancing Strategic Planning with Massive Scenario Generation: Theory and Experiments,” RAND, (2007): 
iii, xi.  
6 Warren E. Walker, “The Use of Scenarios and Gaming in Crisis Management Planning and Training,” RAND, 
(1995): 1.  
7 Gavin Cochrane, Jim Pickett, Jessica Terlikowski, Joanna Chataway and Molly Morgan Jones, “Mapping 
Pathways Toolkit: Scenario Planning Exercises to support consideration of ARV based HIV Prevention 
Strategies,” RAND Europe, (2015): 4. 
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but instead challenge conventional wisdom on what the future may look like.8 For example, I 
will construct scenarios that challenge the assumption nuclear armed powers will not go to 
war with each other and that nuclear weapons have solely deterrent capabilities. A definition 
from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments refers to scenarios as “visions (or 
futures) that present a range of plausible and strategically relevant futures.”9 This being said 
it is important to also recognize that scenarios are “logical” pictures of the future and, 
therefore, cannot be so broad as to be far-fetched or inconsistent with its contexts. Two 
characteristics help ensure the plausibility of a scenario: consistency and credibility. A 
consistent scenario does not possess any elements that are self-contradictory. Consistency 
ensures that “no great unexplained leaps” are made.10 Thus, our scenario will not utilize new 
weapons that have never been created. A credible scenario ensures that every action has a 
reason. It is proper in scenario planning to explore the unexpected, but every action must 
have a reason or a why. For example, our scenarios will exclude cases of accidental nuclear 
first-use because there is no why or motivating reason behind the event. An accident will not 
give us much insight into how Indian and Pakistani officials came to the decision for nuclear 
first-use. The chapters on Indian and Pakistani military doctrine will help inform the 
credibility of our scenarios, giving each military action a reason or a why. Furthermore, 
scenarios must also have strategic relevance, significant to policy makers. In the case of our 
four scenarios the strategic significance is obvious, the outbreak a nuclear war between 
Indian and Pakistan.  
                                                        
8 “Enhancing Strategic Planning,” 4.  
9 Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Rethinking Armageddon: Scenario Planning in the Second Nuclear Age,” Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, (2016): 15. 
10 Walker, “The Use of Scenarios,” 3.  
 9 
There must be some guiding principles that inform the contexts within which a crisis 
scenario unfolds to ensure it is both logical and strategically significant. The context is the 
environment and background in which the crisis takes place. It includes the time, geography, 
the history, and the states’ relationship prior to the conflict. The context is not necessarily a 
predetermined element, as will be extrapolated below, but it sets the limits for a scenario. My 
four scenarios will take place within the context of a continually fraught Indo-Pakistani 
relationship, which will be discussed in chapter four on the history of Kashmir, and in the 
year 2025. The year 2025 is both far enough in the future to allow for uncertainties in Indo-
Pakistani relations regarding the Kashmir conflict, and close enough to the present to help 
establish some predetermined elements, such as the size of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. 
Finally, all four scenarios will take place within the context of the geographical boundaries of 
Kashmir, India, and Pakistan.  
Why devise scenarios in an unpredictable world? We cannot predict the future and 
therefore scenario analysis may receive the criticism of being purely make believe, but 
scenarios allow us to expand our image of the future to better prepare for its uncertainties. It 
is not about forecasting the future and then preparing in great detail a policy to combat the 
inevitable, but rather recognizing the uncertainties that the future may bring and expanding 
upon them to see how certain uncertainties may play out. One important step in scenario 
analysis is establishing what scenario planners call “predetermined elements.”11  
Predetermined elements are a part of the scenario’s context. They are the pieces of the 
future that are highly likely or predictable, such as the growth rate of an economy or the 
demographics of a place. All scenarios will have consistent predetermined elements, but each 
                                                        
11 Krepinevich, “Rethinking Armageddon,” 238.  
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will explore an uncertainty in a different way. For our purposes the uncertainty will be how a 
conflict between India and Pakistan is instigated and then how this act leads to a nuclear first-
use by either nation. The predetermined elements will include the conventional military 
capability and nuclear arsenal of both nations, the organization of both governments and the 
continued conflictual status of the Kashmir conflict. It is highly likely that the growth rates of 
both nation’s military development will continue on the trajectory it is currently taking, with 
India increasingly outpacing Pakistan in conventional build up. Furthermore, the nuclear 
acquisitions of both countries have a certain consistency as well, such as Pakistan’s 
continued acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons. Additionally, it is very likely that the 
Kashmir conflict will not reach any major resolution in the near future, especially with the 
reduction of international interests in the conflict as the United States grows its relationship 
with India and takes a more neutral stance in the region. The demographics of the area are 
expected to remain the same as well, including the growing presence of militant jihad groups 
within Kashmir.  
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments describes scenarios as 
diagnostic because they assist  
decision makers to better understand the security environment by enabling them to 
examine a set of plausible but different futures that capture the inherent uncertainty in 
planning efforts while incorporating predetermined elements.12 
 
By exploring four scenarios that lead to nuclear first-use by India or Pakistan, the 
uncertainties of the Indo-Pakistani relationship that contribute to escalation will be made 
more visible. In other words, we can more clearly see the areas of the Indo-Pakistani 
                                                        
12 Ibid.  
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relationship that are especially escalatory by experimenting with possible futures that include 
a nuclear first-use.  
 Along with identifying predetermined elements, it is helpful to identify the drivers or 
major forces of change before starting a scenario. For our purposes the major forces of 
change will stem from the modern history of Kashmir and Pakistani and Indian military and 
nuclear doctrine. One chapter will be dedicated to each of these important elements of 
scenario context. Each of these chapters conclude with a table of the major forces of change 
explored in it. These summaries will also crystalize the main escalatory uncertainties present 
in the Indo-Pakistani relationship.  
 The four scenarios will be distinguished by “Crisis Initiator” and “Nuclear First 
User.” The Crisis Initiator is the nation that takes the first act of provocation, triggering a 
crisis in Kashmir. The first user will be the nation that escalates a conflict to the nuclear level 
first with the use of a nuclear weapon. I will construct two scenarios where Pakistan is the 
First-User and two where India is the First User. These scenarios will then be subdivided into 
instances in which India and instances in which Pakistan are Crisis Initiators.  The 
breakdown is captured in the Scenario table below. 
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The four scenarios will each give a distinct image of the future for the Southeast Asian 
relationship, and reveal features of the Indo-Pakistani relationship that are especially 
escalatory for the region.  
  
Scenario Typology 
                                              Nuclear First User 
 
 
Crisis 
Initiator 
 Pakistan India 
Pakistan Pakistan initiates 
conflict, Pakistan uses 
nuclear weapons first  
Pakistan initiates 
conflict, India uses 
nuclear weapons first  
India India initiates conflict, 
Pakistan uses nuclear 
weapons first  
India initiates conflict, 
India uses nuclear 
weapons first  
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Chapter 3 
 
Nuclear Escalation Theory: 
Pathways from Subconventional Conflict to Nuclear Red Lines 
  
 14 
To analyze the pathways India and Pakistan may take from subconventional conflict 
to nuclear-use we must begin with escalation theory. Escalation theory suggests various 
mechanisms by which a conflict can jump from low level violence to nuclear war. Here we 
will cover six key principles. Each principle suggests a potential connection between certain 
military actions and India and Pakistan’s nuclear red lines. First, I will outline the escalation 
principle and describe its connection to the Kashmir conflict. Second, I will conclude with a 
table that summarizes each principle and its position in relation to the four scenarios of 
nuclear first-use. 
The place to begin is with Herman Kahn’s Escalation Ladder. Kahn constructed a 
framework for predicting the different escalatory actions in a crisis. He illustrated these 
escalatory actions with a 44-rung ladder, where each rung on the ladder represents a new 
level of intensity in the conflict. Although each rung of the ladder offers an important insight 
into escalation theory, the most important rungs for our purposes are 8 and 13.  
Rung 8 resides only one step below “Dramatic Military Confrontation” and therefore 
resides right below the point where a subconventional conflict transitions into a conventional 
conflict. Relatedly, a new subsection of Kahn’s escalation ladder begins after the Dramatic 
Military Confrontation rung and demarcates the zone where “nuclear incredulity… sharply 
decreases.”13 Rung 8, therefore, begins our analysis because we are concerned with both the 
transition from subconventional to conventional and the transition from nuclear incredulity to 
nuclear first use. The levels of intensity prior to rung 8 matter less to our analysis because 
Kashmir has resided in a rung 8-level of intensity for decades. Rung 8 represents a level of 
intensity where harassing acts of violence are carried out.14 Harassing acts of violence could 
                                                        
13 Herman Kahn, On Escalation : Metaphors and Scenarios, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1986), 43.  
14 Kahn, On Escalation, 43.  
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include Pakistani backed insurgents committing acts of terror or Indian shelling of Pakistani 
road infrastructure. The degree of escalation from harassing acts of violence depends on the 
covert or overt nature of the acts. Escalation is restrained if the action is clandestine and thus 
protected “under the guise of being an individually motivated act of banditry.”15 On the other 
hand, harassing acts of violence with clear evidence of state support or, even worse, overt 
state assertion of responsibility for the violence, will escalate the conflict beyond the next 
rung on the ladder, Dramatic Military Confrontation, and into the zone where nuclear 
incredulity is reduced. The covert or overt nature of the harassing acts of violence carried out 
between India and Pakistan in Kashmir will play an important role in formulating the 
pathways to nuclear first use.  
Rung 13 also deserves special consideration. That is where Large Compound 
Escalation occurs.16 Compound escalation is a strategy of escalation that aims to restrain the 
opponent’s response by escalating horizontally, but in a different theater than the original 
theater of conflict. Typical horizontal escalation entails geographically expanding violence 
within the theater of conflict, but compound escalation aims to limit the retaliatory effect of 
horizontal escalation by diverting the violence to another geographic locale. For example, 
Pakistan instigating civil unrest in Punjab during a crisis in Kashmir is compound escalation. 
Instead of increasing the geographic area of the crisis in the Kashmiri arena, Pakistan creates 
a new area of conflict, thereby, compounding the escalation. Similar to rung 8, the specific 
nature of compound escalation matters. The second theater of conflict chosen by the 
escalating nation is vital to restraining the compound escalation. A particularly sensitive or 
vital area will pose a greater threat to the opposing nation than an area with little value 
                                                        
15 Ibid, 73. 
16 Ibid, 43.   
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attached to it. Just as overt harassing acts of violence will move a subconventional conflict 
beyond the nuclear incredulity zone, a compound escalation strategy that attacks a vital or 
sensitive piece of land will move the crisis further up the rungs of the escalation ladder. Both 
harassing acts of violence and compound escalation could be central to Indian and Pakistani 
strategies of escalation in Kashmir.  
Another important takeaway from escalatory theory is the reality of compound 
expectations, elaborated in the works of Thomas Schelling.17 Within war, surprise carries an 
advantage, and therefore, nations in conflict have an interest in attacking first. The advantage 
of surprise is balanced by the risks associated with a first strike, such as retaliatory attacks 
and tarnished international prestige. The risks balance the perceived advantage of surprise 
and make a strategy of surprise attack less likely, but compound expectations teeter the 
balance back in favor of a surprise strike. Compound expectations occur when player A 
believes player B believes that player A prefers to attack and, therefore, Player A will attack 
to avoid being attacked itself, even if attacking is not its preferred course of action.18 Player 
A and Player B have a reciprocal fear; both sides fear being on the receiving end of a surprise 
attack. Schelling uses the analogy of a burglar and homeowner both wielding guns.19 
Regardless of what the burglar and homeowner’s actual preferences are towards shooting the 
other, their expectations of what the other prefers and what the other perceives their own 
preference to be leads to a very different outcome than the original preference of both the 
homeowner and burglar. If the homeowner prefers not to shoot but believes the burglar 
                                                        
17 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 208.  
18 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 208.  
19 Ibid, 209.   
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thinks he will shoot and, therefore will shoot first out of preemption, then the homeowner 
will shoot first to avoid becoming the victim.  
The first use of nuclear weapons between India and Pakistan may result from 
compounded expectations. Three important factors increase the risk of surprise attack: 
nervousness, weak early warning systems, and fragmented lines of diplomatic 
communication. If Player A notices player B acting nervous or rash then player A may attack 
first out of nervousness rather than out of a rational calculation of the risks.20 Similarly, 
Player A may act more nervous and rash as player B displays these traits, only making Player 
B more nervous. The risk of nuclear first use increases as the players react more and more 
nervously, reducing their ability to calculate risks and increasing their likelihood of acting 
out of fear. An advanced early warning system could diminish the role of nervousness by 
acting as the “rational mechanical counterpart to our nervousness.”21 India and Pakistan’s 
warning systems play a vital role in reducing the likelihood of an attack stemming from the 
reciprocal fear of attack, but their geographic proximity and, therefore, reduced warning 
times may hurt the balancing effect warning systems provide for the compound expectations 
of decision makers.  
Negotiations between player A and player B greatly reduce the chances of a surprise 
attack out of fear. The more information player A has on Player B’s preferences, the less 
likely Player A is to believe that Player B prefers attack or that Player B thinks player A 
prefers attack. As outlined in chapter 2, the diplomatic relationship between Pakistan and 
India has faced major setbacks, most notably the breakdown of the Lahore Declaration 
process with the inception of the Kargil Crisis. According to a report from RAND, for India 
                                                        
20 Ibid, 219.  
21 Ibid, 221. 
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“the most significant conclusion drawn from Kargil is that dealing with Pakistan… is going 
to be deeply problematic and perhaps even justifies minimal contact with Islamabad.”22 India 
and Pakistan’s history of mistrust may limit the neutralizing effect negotiation can have on 
the reciprocal fear of attack.  
 Compound expectations depend on a player’s beliefs about the other players 
preferences or the other players beliefs about the first player’s preferences, but another facet 
of escalation theory focuses on players’ expectations of each other based on chosen 
conventional strategies. Barry Posen argues that inadvertent escalation risk arises from 
situations where a strategy using conventional weapons greatly threatens “the nuclear 
retaliatory capability of the victim’s second-strike capability.”23 Although the conventional 
attack may have other purposes, the victim may perceive the strike as an attempt to degrade 
their nuclear capabilities. Nations that adopt conventional counterforce strategies, ones that 
attack targets of military value, run the risks of inadvertently escalating a conflict from 
conventional to nuclear. The possibility of inadvertent escalation through conventional 
counterforce strikes is greater when the target nation relies on nuclear weapons “for purposes 
of bargaining or damage limitation” or subscribes to a military doctrine that hinges on 
nuclear weapons capabilities.24  
Recently, scholars are increasingly attentive to inadvertent escalation with respect to a 
possible U.S.-Chinese conventional war. Talmadge outlined the ways that U.S. conventional 
strikes may inadvertently degrade Chinese nuclear capabilities and, therefore, prompt a 
                                                        
22 Ashley J. Tellis, “Limited Conflicts under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the 
Kargil Crisis,” Rand, (2001): 16.  
23 Barry Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1991) 2.  
24 Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 3. 
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greater retaliatory action by the Chinese military. The warnings Talmadge outlines regarding 
U.S. conventional strategy towards China provide a useful addition to the theory of 
inadvertent escalation and, consequently, aide our analysis of pathways to nuclear first use.  
The first point of significance is the risks associated with comingling of conventional 
and nuclear weapons. The comingling of nuclear and conventional weapons makes 
differentiating an attack’s intended goal more difficult. For example, an attack on land based 
missiles with dual-capabilities, those that can be mounted with conventional warheads and 
nuclear warheads, could be misinterpreted by the victim. The attack, intended to damage a 
nation’s conventional forces, may be perceived as an attempt to nuclear disarm a nation by 
rendering their delivery systems inept. Similarly, attacks on bases with both conventional and 
nuclear weapons or dual-purpose command, control, communication, and computer (C4) 
systems produce the same inadvertent escalation risk. The risk of a conventional strike 
inadvertently escalating a conflict to the nuclear stage increases,  
If the target state physically collocates its nuclear forces with conventional weapons, 
extensively employs dual-capable platforms, relies heavily on conventional forces to 
protect or support nuclear forces, or bases nuclear weapons or related infrastructure in 
areas physically proximate to conventional battlefields.25  
 
The military doctrines of both India and Pakistan, as well as the degree of comingling of their 
nuclear and conventional capabilities, will further enlighten the pathways to nuclear-use and 
whether a conventional strike could inadvertently escalate an Indian-Pakistani conflict. 
Chapters 4 and 5 will investigate the military doctrines of India and Pakistan, as well as the 
degree of comingling.  
                                                        
25 C. Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a 
Conventional War with the United States,” International Security, (Spring 2017): 60.  
 20 
Along with military doctrines, the balance of conventional capabilities between 
nations determines how heavily a country will rely on nuclear weapons to balance or deter a 
conventional attack. Jasen J. Castillo draws attention to the problem of offsetting superior 
conventional power with nuclear power stating, “threatening the first use of nuclear weapons 
could represent the best course of action for a regime with few conventional options for 
defense.”26 The conventional military balance between India and Pakistan determines the 
likelihood of either nation employing nuclear weapons in a counter conventional strike. If 
India or Pakistan gains a significant conventional superiority, the probability that the other 
nation employs nuclear weapons on the battlefield to diminish the conventional gap 
increases. The likely nuclear postures of Pakistan and India will be explored in Chapters 4 
and 5.  
Finally, the military preference for the offensive makes nuclear escalation more likely 
for countries with poor civil-military relations. An absence of a strong civilian-military 
balance in decision making becomes an issue because “professional military organizations… 
display strong proclivities toward organizational behaviors that lead to deterrence failures.”27 
Scott Sagan determines that military officers have strong biases toward offensive doctrines. 
Military bias stems from both the tendency to assume war is “likely in the near term and 
inevitable in the long run,” as well as incremental planning and the innately conflictual 
nature of organizations.28 Military professionals, socialized in a military environment and 
surrounded constantly by the prospect of war, will deem war more likely than their civilian 
                                                        
26 Jasen J. Castillo, “Deliberate Escalation Nuclear Strategies to Deter or Stop Conventional Attacks,” in 
Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics, ed. Kelly M. Greenhill (Ithaca: Oxford University Press, 
2018) 291.  
27 Scott Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation,” International Security 18, no. 4 (1994): 68. 
28 Sagan, “Deliberate Escalation,” 76. 
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counterparts and in some cases even inevitable; therefore, the expectation for more offensive 
actions is higher for military leaders than civilian leaders. The argument that military 
organizations will be restrained by long term goals assumes both long term planning and 
aligned goals within an association. Organizations, such as the military, do not always act in 
the best interest of the organization itself because of conflicting interests within 
organizations. Even if nuclear restraint is in the military’s best interest to reach its goals, it 
may not be in the best interests of military units in the field or the weapons operators. 
Furthermore, conflicting interests lead to “satisfice” or “accept[ing] the first option that is 
minimally satisfying” instead of decision-making based on long term goals.29 A military 
government may accept a nuclear first use strategy as a minimally satisfying option, instead 
of exploring further diplomatic solutions. An organization’s propensity for short term 
decision-making intensifies the possibility that military leaders will fail to perceive the future 
long-term consequences of an offensive nuclear strategy. The power of civilian leaders 
within Pakistan and India is fundamental to informing the pathways to nuclear first use 
between the nations because a lack of civilian checks on military power precipitates the 
offensive and decisive strategy of nuclear first-use.  
 Nuclear escalation theory offers six important insights for determining the likely 
pathways between India and Pakistan from subconventional conflict in Kashmir to first-use 
of nuclear weapons. First, overtly state sponsored harassing acts of violence could lead to 
escalation beyond the nuclear incredulity threshold, as well as compound escalation 
strategies that attack vital geographic regions. Second, the expectations of decision makers 
about the other nation’s preferences for surprise attack could create a reciprocal fear of attack 
                                                        
29 Ibid, 72. 
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that leads to nuclear-first-use, especially with the addition of displays of nervousness, faulty 
early warning systems, and broken lines of communication. Third, the conventional strategies 
of counterforce attacks could increase the likelihood of nuclear escalation by inadvertently 
attacking a nation’s ability to maintain a second-strike capability, creating a “use them or 
lose them” scenario. Fourth, the comingling of nuclear and conventional capabilities 
increases the likelihood of inadvertent escalation. Fifth, the conventional military balance 
between two nations partly determines the nuclear postures adopted by those countries, 
where a large disparity in conventional capabilities correlates to riskier nuclear postures 
including the possibility of counter conventional strikes. Finally, civil-military relations will 
determine whether the military can employ offensive decisive actions, such as nuclear first-
use strategies, without the check of civilian leaders that lack the military preference for 
offensive action.  
The six criteria derived from nuclear escalation theory undergird our analysis of the 
four pathways to nuclear first use. They will be highlighted in the next chapters evaluating 
the military doctrines of India and Pakistan. 
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 General Escalation Principle Specific Relevance 
 
 
3.1 
Harassing Acts of Violence escalate a 
conflict to the point where nuclear first-
use is credible, especially if overtly state-
sponsored.  
Pakistani backed insurgents commit act of 
terror in India, with clear evidence of state 
sponsorship.  
India shells Pakistani road infrastructure.  
 
 
3.2 
An actor diverts violence to a new theater 
of conflict, compounding the escalation. 
This action is especially escalatory when 
the new theater of conflict is of national 
importance. 
Pakistan backs an insurgency in the Punjab 
of India, a vital and sensitive state in the 
Indian Union.  
 
 
 
 
3.3 
Compound Expectations occur when a 
country decides to attack because it 
believes the adversary thinks it will, and 
therefore, fears a preemptive strike by the 
adversary. Compound expectations are 
heightened by nervousness, faulty early 
warning systems, and broken lines of 
communication.  
India uses nuclear weapons first because it 
believes Pakistan thinks it will perform a 
surgical strike, due to India’s Cold Start 
doctrine, and, therefore, Pakistan may 
employ TNWs out of preemption.  
 
 
 
3.4 
Using a conventional counterforce 
strategy, a nation may unintentionally 
attack its adversary’s nuclear capabilities 
by striking dual-use technology, 
therefore, inadvertently creating a “use 
them or lose them” scenario for the 
nuclear adversary.  
India, following a conventional counterforce 
strategy, inadvertently limits Pakistan’s 
ability to employ its tactical nuclear 
weapons, thereby creating a “use them or 
lose them” scenario for Pakistan, who relies 
on TNWs for defense and diplomatic 
bargaining purposes.  
 
3.5 
A superior conventional capability by 
one nation may lead its adversary to 
adopt a more escalatory nuclear posture.  
India’s growing conventional capability has 
led Pakistan to rely more heavily on its 
nuclear forces, evidenced by Pakistan’s first 
use policy and its buildup of TNWs.  
 
3.6 
An absence of civilian-military balance 
in a nation may lead to more offensive 
actions because the military prefers the 
offensive.  
Pakistan’s military remains a powerful and 
largely unchecked power in Pakistan and 
may adopt more offensive military strategies, 
including nuclear first-use.  
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Chapter 4 
 
A History of Kashmir: 
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Partition  
During British rule of the Indian Empire, some states held a certain level of autonomy 
in governing the region with the condition of recognizing the “paramountcy of the British 
Crown”, the so-called princely states.30 The princely states included the region of Kashmir, a 
stretch of land with a majority Muslim population and a Hindu Maharaja. At the time of the 
British Indian Empire’s partition in 1947, English viceroy Lord Mountbatten passed an edict 
dividing the Empire between Pakistan and India on the basis of religion, with predominantly 
Hindu areas belonging to India and predominantly Muslim areas belonging to Pakistan.31 The 
princely states were given a choice to accede either to India or Pakistan, but Maharaja Hari 
Sigh of Kashmir refused to choose. This is where the long-standing Indo-Pakistani struggle 
for Kashmir began.  
Kashmir’s choice was not as clear cut as the edict from Lord Mountbatten may have 
made it seem. The choice between India and Pakistan was not merely one of Hindu or 
Muslim, because the newly independent nations possessed vastly different ideological 
foundations and forms of governance at the time of partition. India, led by the Indian 
Nationalist movement, wanted a secular and democratic government for the newly 
independent state. In stark contrast, Pakistan had its roots in Islam, subscribing to Jinnah’s 
two nation theory, which contended Muslims could not live comfortably under a secular 
government that was dominated by Indian Hindus. According to President of the Muslim 
League Jinnah, Southeast Asia needed a Muslim homeland. During British colonial rule 
Muslim-Hindu separatism was hardened by the Minto-Morley constitutional reforms of 
1909, which created separate electorates for the Indian Muslim population and ultimately 
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aided in the consolidation of the Muslim community.32 Once the Muslim community was 
consolidated and Jinnah proposed his two-nation hypothesis for the creation of a separate 
Southeast Asian Muslim homeland, the chances of a unified post-independent Hindu-Muslim 
India dissipated. By the time of partition in 1947, Pakistan had established itself as the 
Islamic neighbor to India’s west while India pushed on towards a secular orientation.  
Beyond religious orientation, India and Pakistan differed in their vision for 
governance as well. The Indian National Congress transformed into a mass-based political 
party thanks to Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. In contrast, Pakistan’s leadership 
“adhered to constitutional politics… not grassroots levels” and relied on landed gentry 
support for the Muslim League.33 The decision, therefore, for Kashmir’s accession was not 
only complicated because of the divided religious orientation of its leadership and 
population, but also because the mostly poor population of Kashmir saw brighter prospects 
for land reform in democratic India. Opinion within Kashmir about accession to Pakistan and 
India was hardly uniform, so in 1947 when a tribal rebellion struck the southwest region of 
Kashmir, Pakistan and India began the race to acquire Kashmir.  
First Kashmir War  
 Pakistan aided and supported “Azad Kashmir” forces at the outbreak of violence in 
Pooch. Maharaja Hari Sigh could not contain the rebels alone and called on Indian Prime 
Minister Nehru to assist him in fighting the Pakistani-backed insurgency.34 India agreed to 
help on the condition that Kashmir accede to India and Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the 
mass based political party the All Jammu and Muslim Conference, would give his approval 
                                                        
32 Ibid, 10. 
33 Ibid, 10.  
34 Ibid, 17. 
 27 
of the accession. India immediately began providing the Maharaja assistance after he signed 
the Instrument of Accession and thus the First Kashmir War began on October 24, 1947.35  
Fighting raged on in Kashmir until the United Nation’s ceasefire in January 1948. 
India referred the Kashmir question to the UN Security Council claiming that Pakistan had 
attacked Kashmir disrupting the region’s peace and stability.36 Pakistan counter claimed that 
India was carrying out genocidal policies towards Kashmiri Muslims. The UN demanded 
both regimes withdrawal troops from Kashmir by April and a UN commission encouraged a 
free and fair plebiscite by a Jammu and Kashmir coalition cabinet to be held in Kashmir 
regarding the issue of post-partition accession.37 A plebiscite was never held. The UN 
Ceasefire also led to the signing of the Karachi Agreement in 1949, which defined the 
ceasefire line (CFL) and divided Kashmir into two parts: one-part Pakistani and one-part 
Indian.38 Another important UN step was the creation of the United Nations Military 
Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which was tasked “to investigate and 
mediate the dispute between India and Pakistan,” more specifically to help mediate minor 
violations along the CFL.39  
Pakistan and India came close to fighting in Kashmir twice before the Delhi Accord 
of July 24, 1952, only to be deescalated by the tactful leadership skills of Pakistan’s Prime 
Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The General 
Council of the Jammu and Kashmir Conference signed the Delhi Accord “(stripping) the 
maharaja of all his powers and (making) him subordinate to the assembly… (and limiting) 
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India’s jurisdiction in Kashmir.”40 The Delhi Accord lapsed when Abdullah expressed some 
concerns over the small level of autonomy it granted Kashmir and India promptly placed him 
under house arrest and replaced him as chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir.41 Nehru then 
further rejected any plebiscite to settle the question of Kashmir once the US-Pakistani 
military alliance was established and India perceived any hope of an unbiased UN plebiscite 
administrator to be unlikely. The question of Kashmir continued to hang in the balance.  
Second Kashmir War  
The events that led to the next Kashmir War in 1965 reveal both the insecurity India 
felt after the Sino-Indian War and the Pakistani military’s flawed analysis of their strategic 
environment. In 1962 the Sino-Indian War concluded with an embarrassing defeat for the 
Indian military, whereby India lost 14,000 square miles of territory.42 The conflict left India 
willing to invest heavily in a military modernization plan, including the creation of a 45-
squadron air force.43 As the security dilemma suggests, India’s efforts to revamp its security 
left its neighbor to the West feeling increasingly threatened. Pakistan’s fears were further 
heightened by the continued deterioration of Kashmiri rights brought on by changing Indian 
policy. In December of 1964, Kashmir’s special federal status was hurt by an extension of 
Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution to Kashmir, which “would enable the Indian 
federal government in New Delhi to promulgate so-called president’s rule in the state during 
times of crisis… parliament was empowered to make laws.”44 Symbolically Kashmir’s 
autonomy was hit when the Kashmir Legislative Assembly abandoned the title of sadr-i-
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riyasat (head of state) for the title of “governor,” and made the governor role “subject to 
appointment by the president of India, not the Kashmir Legislative Assembly.” To Pakistan, 
it seemed its window of opportunity to significantly change the current status quo border in 
Kashmir was shrinking as India modernized its military and sought tighter control over 
Indian administered Kashmir. Pakistan, therefore, developed a plan named Operation 
Gibraltar to foment a rebellion in Kashmir.  
The plan was accelerated by Pakistani assessment that India would not launch on all 
out response to Pakistani provocations based on their restrained response to the minor 
infiltration Pakistan conducted into the Rann of Kutch earlier in the year. The Pakistanis 
failed to see that the Rann of Kutch did not hold the same political significance that Kashmir 
did and further blundered their assessment by assuming the Chinese would assist Pakistan in 
the event of an aggressive response from India, even though Che’en Yi made no overt 
promises. By August 5, 1965 Pakistan began its infiltration across the Ceasefire Line of 
Kashmir.45 The Kashmiris did not quickly organize to join in the rebellion like Pakistan had 
predicted, but instead alerted Indian authorities of the aggressors. War ensued. Once again, 
the international community stepped in to end the violent exchange between India and 
Pakistan across the Ceasefire line. Both countries accepted the UN ceasefire late in 
September.  
Bangladesh War  
The Bangladesh War of 1971 was truly the result of Pakistan’s inaction in defending 
East Pakistan during the Second Kashmir War. “The West Pakistani elites’ decision to leave 
East Pakistan only lightly defended stoked the embers of Bengali sub-nationalism.”46 Bengali 
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nationalism had already been fomenting since partition as a result of several Pakistani 
policies such as the imposition of Urdu as the national language. In addition to forcing 
Bengalis to speak Urdu, West Pakistan also had a large advantage in political and military 
representation and was overwhelmingly allocated more foreign aid than East Pakistan. 
Bengalis in East Pakistan began to notice the discrepancies in Pakistan’s federative 
arrangement and how they were falling behind West Pakistan. In an effort to reach political 
accommodation with the East Pakistanis, Pakistani President Ayub Khan convened a round 
table and constructed the Six Point Programme. The Six Points called for the end of military 
rule and the formation of a parliamentary democracy with federal oversight restricted to areas 
such as defense and foreign policy. The Six Point Programme was a last-ditch effort to 
appease East Pakistani’s discontent, but unfortunately the programme failed to martialize.47 
The Bengali nationalists, organized under the Awami League, a political party in opposition 
to the dominate Muslim League, were left without any accommodation.  
Chief of Army Staff Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan became Pakistan’s president and 
issued the Legal Framework Order (LFO) on March 31, 1970. The LFO had similar 
principles to the Six Point Programme, but the Awami League, saw discrepancies and 
refused to abandon the Six Point Programme. The 1970 election resulted in the Awami 
League winning every seat contested in East Pakistan. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
refused to concede any power to the East Pakistanis and stalled the seating of the National 
Assembly. Soon after the elections of 1970, in March, East Pakistan vocalized its desires for 
regional autonomy and the leader of the Bangladesh Liberation Front Sheikh Mujib called for 
a strike across East Pakistan. After a failed compromise termed the Dacca Dialogue, Yayha 
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Khan ordered the immediate restoration of order in East Pakistan, giving authority to the 
Pakistani military to enact Operation Searchlight.  
On March 25, 1971 the most brutal military attack on a civilian population ever seen 
in South Asia began.48 The country descended into full scale civil war and 10 million 
refugees fled to India. The surge of Bengali refugees to India quickly became a national 
security concern for the leadership in New Delhi who feared the increasingly Muslim 
population would incite “communal discord.”49 India also had much to gain geo-strategically 
from an independent East Pakistan, which would provide a non-hostile neighbor to its East. 
The civil war in Pakistan became a regional conflict on April 17 when India involved itself in 
the war by permitting an East Pakistani government in exile to operate out of the Indian state 
Baidyanath Tala.50 India’s involvement gradually grew from supplying arms and aide to 
Bengali guerilla forces, the Mukti Bahini, to overt Indian military involvement following the 
Pakistani preemptive air strike on India’s northern military bases.51 The war waged on until 
December 17 when Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi called for a unilateral ceasefire and 
President Yahya Khan of Pakistan followed suit.52 The accord that followed the Bangladesh 
War, the Simla Agreement, repatriated prisoners of war, restored Indo-Pakistani diplomatic 
relations, and “changed nomenclature for the 1948 ceasefire line in Kashmir to the Line of 
Control.”53 East Pakistan emerged as a newly independent state, Bangladesh. Pakistan’s 
ideological foundation as a Muslim homeland in South Asia was badly injured by the 
secession of East Pakistan and therefore their claim on Kashmir weakened. India emerged 
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from the Bangladesh war as a dominant regional power and more secure on its Eastern 
border. It is also important to note that following the Simla Agreement, India stopped 
recognizing the presence of UNMOGIP as valid along the Indo-Pakistani border.  
India has maintained that the mandate of UNMOGIP had lapsed, since it’s mandate 
related specifically to the ceasefire line under the Karachi Agreement, Pakistan, 
however did not accept this position.54  
 
The repudiation of UMOGIP’s legitimacy has made management of the LOC more difficult 
and cut out yet another mediating source in Kashmir. Furthermore, India has not official 
asked UNMOGIP to withdrawal from the area to avoid moving the Kashmir question back 
into UN Security Council debates.55 
“Ugly Stability” 
The Simla Agreement fostered in a period of relative peace on the continent, although 
several crises brought India and Pakistan close to conflict in the 70s and 80s. One point of 
tension arose from the inadequate demarcation of the Line of Control over the Siachen 
Glacier.56 In the wake of the Siachen Glacier dispute, Pakistan began supplying aide to Sikh 
insurgents in India’s state of Punjab.57 In the midst of the Punjab insurgency, India launched 
a military exercise that led India and Pakistan to the brink of war. The exercise was named 
Brasstacks and took place “along the east west axis pointing towards Pakistan.”58 Pakistan, 
feeling threatened by India’s exercise, launched one of their own titled Shaf-e-Shikan. India 
questioned Pakistani motives for the exercise when the troops remained near the border of 
Punjab and Kashmir after the completion of the Shaf-e-Shikan exercise. India responded by 
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mobilizing troops to the Punjab-Kashmir border. It seemed both nations were well on their 
way to a fourth war, but luckily tensions dissipated through secretary level talks from 
January 31 to February 4.59  
India continued to chip away at the “quantum of autonomy” that Kashmir held, 
including the “flawed local elections of 1987.”60 Crisis peaked in 1990 following increasing 
amounts of violence in Kashmir. With calls for secession from the Jammu and Kashmir 
Liberation Front reverberating through the valley, Pakistani President Benazir Bhutto 
vocalized support for the Kashmiri insurgents.  Once again Pakistan and India mobilized 
forces to the border region of Punjab and a clash seemed inevitable, but foreign ministers 
Inder Kumar Gujral of India and Shahibzada Yakub Khan of Pakistan met in New York to 
discuss de-escalation.61 The United States aided bilateral talks between India and Pakistan, 
fearing the conflict would soon take on a nuclear dimension and war was averted once more. 
Both the Brasstacks Crisis and the 1990 Compound Crisis highlight the “ugly stability” that 
has taken hold in South Asia regarding the question of Kashmir. 
Nuclearization 
Pakistan and India took similar paths to nuclear weaponization. Both President Ayub 
Khan of Pakistan and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India rejected the weaponization 
of nuclear power at first and pursued civilian nuclear programs, Pakistan beginning in 195062 
and India in 1948.63 Both nations reversed course on their peaceful nuclear rhetoric after 
humiliating military defeats. India began its progression towards full nuclear weaponization 
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following its humiliating defeat at the hand of the Chinese in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. 
Likewise, Pakistan began its nuclear weapons program following the humiliating defeat of 
the Bangladesh War and the severance of East Pakistan from West Pakistan. India’s 
“peaceful” nuclear explosion in May 1974 further cemented the need for nuclearization in the 
minds of Pakistani leaders like Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.64 By 1980, Pakistan had 
secret uranium enrichment facilities, headed by notorious proliferator A.Q. Khan.65 On May 
11 and 13 of 1998, India launched five nuclear test explosions.66 Pakistan followed and tested 
its nuclear weapons for the first time on May 28, 1998 and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif stated “These weapons are to deter aggressions, whether nuclear or conventional.”67 
Suddenly all eyes were on the Southeast Asian region. The Kashmir conflict now officially 
had a nuclear component.  
The Kargil War  
The next major conflict for Pakistan and India came in the spring of 1999. Pakistan 
instigated the conflict with an attempt to “infiltrate regular troops from the Northern Light 
Infantry and Kashmiri insurgents across a 150 kilometer stretch of the LOC at three points in 
Patalik, Dras, and Kargil.”68 The Pakistani incursion took place at the same time Prime 
Minister Muhammed Nawaz Sharif was in Lahore signing the Lahore Declaration, which 
reaffirmed the peace of the Simla Agreement of 1972.69 700 to 1,000 Pakistani soldiers 
moved in to occupy “the strategic heights overlooking the all-important National Highway 
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1A, India’s only land access to its forces deployed on the disputed Siachen Glacier.”70 
Pakistan’s incursion into Kargil was a complete surprise and India only discovered it when a 
regular Indian brigade did not return from its patrol in Kargil. After discovering the intrusion 
of Pakistani regulars and Kashmiri insurgents along the LOC in over 70 positions, India 
began its air strike mission Operation Vijay on May 26.71 The international community, 
especially the United States, jumped into action to deescalate the situation between nuclear 
rivals. The discovery by the international community and India of the use of Pakistani regular 
forces in the Kargil incursion sealed their image on the international scene as an aggressor 
and by July 14 Pakistan was forced to withdraw.72 
 There are multiple reasons Pakistan conducted its Kargil operation, which ultimately 
sealed its international image as a reckless nuclear armed nation. First, Pakistan wanted to 
bring the Kashmir issue back into the international spotlight and wrongly assumed the world 
would sympathize with its cause regarding India’s occupation of the Siachen Glacier and 
human rights abuses in Kashmir.73 Secondly, Pakistani decision makers saw its nascent 
nuclear capabilities as a source of impunity from Indian counter-aggression. In addition, 
Pakistan once again overestimated its ability to reinvigorate the insurgency within Kashmir 
and equally overestimated the possibility of Chinese intervention in support of Pakistan.74 
Prime Minister Sharif denied the existence of Pakistani regular forces in Kargil. Sharif was 
desperately trying to hold onto the image of Pakistan as an innocent victim to Indian 
aggression and that the infiltration was carried out by self-motivated Kashmiri mujahedeen. 
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India revealed tape recordings of a conversation between two Pakistani officials overtly 
stating their involvement in the Kargil Operation.75 Any doubt that Pakistan was behind the 
attacks dissipated.  
India responded to the incursion “throwing as many as 20,000 troops into the 
contested area” and launching Operation Vijay, a series of air strikes that never crossed the 
LOC.7677 Pakistan perceived the use of the Indian Air Force as an unnecessary escalation. 
Pakistan responded with threats to employ its nuclear arsenal, including a statement from 
Pakistani foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad Khan that Pakistan “will not hesitate to use any 
weapon in our arsenal” and a warning from Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif about Pakistan’s 
“ultimate weapon.78 By July it was clear Pakistan lacked the favor of the international 
community and so the regime succumbed to United States’ demands for withdrawal after the 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met with U.S. President Clinton.79 Withdrawal began on July 
14.80 By restraining its response to the Indian side of the LOC, India established itself as a 
responsible nuclear power. There was no official war termination agreement and Pakistan 
never acknowledged the presence of its regular forces.81 
Post 9/11: India, Pakistan, and the United States  
The relationship between India, Pakistan, and the United States is important to the 
region since the United States has played the major third-party mediator role in several crises 
on the continent. Furthermore, the nature of the United States relationship with the two 
Southeast Asian nations changed drastically at the turn of the century and the newer 
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dynamics will be vital to understanding any conflict post-Kargil. Although the United States 
traditionally aligned itself with Pakistan as a result of Cold War politics and its “geographic 
proximity to the erstwhile Soviet Union and China,”82 Indo-U.S. relations have improved 
drastically in the past two decades. First of all, the Kargil conflict, as noted before, sealed 
India’s image as a responsible nuclear power in the international sphere. Furthermore, the 
United States is aware and warry of Pakistan’s growing relationship with China and their 
propensity towards changing the status quo ante in the region (as a revisionist power). Most 
importantly, the 9/11 attacks on the world trade center in New York and the subsequent “war 
on terrorism” has had a conflicting effect on U.S.-Pakistani relations. On the one hand, 
Pakistan became vital to the U.S. war in Afghanistan and Pakistan gained some leveraging 
power vis a vis the United States with their role in hosting U.S. troops, training Afghan 
soldiers, and protecting their Western border. On the other hand, Pakistan has proved a 
problematic ally for the United States in its Afghanistan campaign with both its complicated 
relationship to the Taliban and its own promotion of terrorism in Indian Kashmir. Pakistan is 
geo-strategically important to the United States, while being ideologically problematic.  
India has benefitted from the complicated nature of Pakistani-U.S. ties. India has been 
able to frame itself as a fellow nation fighting the good fight against terrorism. India has been 
able to play on the pathos of the United States by framing itself as a nation also threatened by 
global terrorism, promoted by its neighbor to the West. India and the United States have 
continued to expand their defense relationship including the largest joint army and navy 
exercises Balance Iroquois and Exercise Malabar, which took place in May 2018.83 The most 
concerning piece of newly positive Indo-American defense ties, in the eyes of Pakistani 
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officials, came in 2008 with the singing of the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear deal “that allowed 
India access to dual use technology in defiance of global norms,” which Pakistan saw as an 
easy route for India to divert those civilian nuclear resources for military use.84 As Pakistan’s 
geo-strategic importance to the United States lessens, with the withdrawal of troops from 
Afghanistan, the shifting alliances may have several implications for Kashmir. Pakistan may 
fear a stronger US-India alliance and align itself more closely with China or officials may 
even perceive the window of opportunity to change the status quo in Kashmir to be closing. 
India may also feel emboldened by its improving relations with the West and feel more 
comfortable taking aggressive actions against Pakistani-backed insurgents in Kashmir. Also, 
with the election of President Donald Trump and a wave of isolationism sweeping the United 
States, the old peace broker may be less inclined to step in when India and Pakistan clash.85 
The 2001-2002 Military Standoff  
Indo-Pakistani relations were severely hurt by the Kargil crisis. India lost its faith in 
bilateral negotiations with Pakistan, illustrated by the failed Agra summit of 2000.  The de 
facto ceasefire along the LOC in 2000 paralleled some of the highest levels of militant 
infiltration into Indian Kashmir.86 Furthermore Pakistan’s coup of 1999 brought the man 
responsible for orchestrating the Kargil operation into power, General Pervez Musharraf.87 
The state of Indo-Pakistani relations seemed ripe for conflict and the events of 2001 and 
2002 provided a catalyst. These two crises together are often referred to as the “Twin Peaks” 
because tensions between India and Pakistan peaked immediately following both attacks.  
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On December 13, 2001 five-armed terrorist broke into the Indian parliament building 
in New Delhi, with the intention to “kill Indian political leaders,” killing seven people and 
injuring many more.88 India attributed the attack to Pakistani supported terrorist groups 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), operating in Pakistani controlled 
Kashmir. Pakistan denied any involvement, but India launched a full-scale military 
mobilization in response, named Operation Parakram.89 It took the Indian Army weeks to 
mobilize to the international border. The Pakistani army counter-mobilized troops so that 
“the two sides had nearly a million soldiers eye ball to eye ball on the international border.”90 
Pakistan’s countermobilization included the movement of two corps stationed on its Western 
border with Afghanistan (vital to the U.S. campaign there).91 When the Indian Cabinet 
Committee on Security authorized the movement of Indian troops, it explicitly stated its 
favorability towards limited operations or “short and intense war.”92 Pakistan responded with 
a mixed signal of restraint and cautionary warning. President Musharraf announced his 
willingness to cooperate in punishing the militants responsible for the actions, specifically 
banning LeT and JeM. Pakistan then tested its nuclear capable Agni I ballistic missile 13 
days after his speech.93 Only a month into the crisis nuclear signaling had occurred. There is 
some speculation that Pakistan even moved its M-11 nuclear capable missiles to the border, 
although Pakistan denies this claim.94  
Pakistan was not the only nation flexing its nuclear strength. India sent more 
aggressive nuclear signals during this time including a statement from the Indian Prime 
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Minister that “No weapon would be spared in self-defense. Whatever weapon was available, 
it would be used no matter how much it wounded the enemy.”95 Public statements of nuclear 
signaling were ample during this time, although bilateral communication between India and 
Pakistan was essentially nonexistent (India removed its high commissioner to Islamabad only 
8 days after the attack.)96 Crisis de-escalation relied on third party talks via the United States. 
Pakistan played on U.S. vital interests in Afghanistan while India made comparisons to the 
United States’ “war on terrorism.”  
The U.S. succeeded in keeping the initial “peak” of the crisis from erupting into war 
by encouraging Pakistan to make public promises to take punitive action against LeT and 
JeM and also by reassuring India of its neutrality in the crisis. The U.S. major 
accomplishment was to constrain India and encourage Pakistan to arrest 2,000 militants 
following President Musharraf’s January speech.97 The task of de-escalation grew tougher 
when the second “peak” struck. By the time of the second peak many of the arrested militants 
were released (an estimated 1,800 of the 2,000 detained)98 and cross border infiltration into 
Indian Kashmir was on the rise again, repeating the usual cycle of Pakistani “crackdown” on 
LeT and JeM. 
The second rise in Indo-Pakistani border tensions came on May 14, 2002 when 
terrorist struck again on a bus and an Indian army camp in the town of Kaluchak in Jammu.99 
Over thirty people were killed in the army camp attack, mostly military family members. 
India once again blamed LeT, the group with close ties to Pakistan’s Inter-Services 
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Intelligence agency (ISI). The Indian Army initially responded with “heavy shelling across 
the LOC,”100 but from this point onward the crisis unfolded almost identically to the first 
peak. Musharraf made a speech promising a crackdown on militancy and India relied on third 
party talks via the United States instead of military might. India avoided a politically 
unsavory end to the conflict by attributing their demobilization to the favorable outcome of 
the Kashmir state elections in September 2002.101 During the second peak India employed 
the same reliance on pathos, appealing to America’s position on global terrorism, and 
Pakistan relied on its Afghanistan leverage. Both nations made several nuclear signals and 
statements again, but overall the second peak de-escalated at a faster rate than the first.  
The crisis officially reached a close on October 16, 2002, ten months after the first 
“peak,” when India “undertook strategic relocation” from the border.102 It is important to 
note that throughout both “peaks” Pakistan never stopped trying to link the crises resolution 
to the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan publicly called for the United States to act as a mediator to 
the Kashmir conflict, but the United States dodged these requests, never truly taking a 
side.103 Pakistan still, even when in poor international standing, attempts to bring the question 
of Kashmir back into the international consciousness. It is also vital to understand that the 
slow mobilization of Indian troops during Operation Parakram led to a reconceptualization of 
India military doctrine and the adoption of Cold Start (covered thoroughly in Chapter 5). The 
years that followed the twin peaks crises were marked by “a hand of friendship” from Indian 
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and a ceasefire on the LOC.104 
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2003 Ceasefire Agreement  
Although terrorists’ attacks and large wars like the Bangladesh War do plague the 
region, the most common aggressions in Kashmir happen along the Line of Control in the 
form of Ceasefire Violations (CVFs). According to Pakistani sources, 1,390 CFVs have 
taken place since 2011, while Indian sources estimate up to 1,948 CFVs in that time.105 Both 
India and Pakistan have their explanations for CVFs. India claims Pakistan uses shelling to 
cover terrorists crossing the LOC into Indian Kashmir, while Pakistan claims the Indian side 
shells innocent Kashmiri civilians. The frequency and amplitude of CFVs is very dependent 
on the facts on the ground. CFVs are “generally not planned or directed by higher military or 
political authorities.”106 In other words, officers in field have a great level of autonomy along 
the LOC, especially in times of great tension when time is of the essence. CFVs have been 
greater during periods of tension between the two neighbors. For example, following the Uri 
attacks of 2016 CFVs greatly increased. During tense periods, the basic form of 
communication across the LOC, “flag meetings,” are halted, contributing further to the 
potential for inadvertent escalation or compound expectations.107  
On the other had following the Ceasefire Agreement of 2003, CFVs lessened 
significantly. Pakistani Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali offered a unilateral 
ceasefire in 2003, which India accepted, and CFVs basically halted until 2009.108 The 2003 
CFA is the only ceasefire agreement that did not follow an Indo-Pakistani war or utilize a 
third-party mediator and it was the direct result of increased CFVs,109 which reached 5,767 in 
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2002 according to Indian sources.110 Sadly, the CFA didn’t keep CFVs from continuing post-
2009.  
Further complicating the situation of CFVs has been the inability of Pakistan or India 
to approve Ground Rules. Although several talks have been held, the two sides can’t seem to 
compromise, specifically India will not budge on the point of forbidding the building of new 
defense fortifications. India sees defense fortifications as vital to combat the natural defense 
structures, such as canals, on the Pakistani side of the LOC.111 India’s maintenance of old 
defense structures and building of new ones has become a major flashpoint for CFVs, such as 
the fence along the LOC in Kashmir. India also refuses to formalize the oral 2003 CFA in 
writing, in an effort to keep all options open in the face of terrorism.  
Some may brush aside CFVs as a part of the stability/instability paradox and not a true 
concern for escalation to the nuclear level, but CFVs may prove very escalatory if happening 
in tandem with other provocations such as Indian surgical strikes along the LOC or Pakistani 
terrorists’ provocations.  
The 2008 Mumbai Crisis  
Peace, or what amounted to peace considering the ugly stability between the rivals, 
did not last long. Terrorist attacks within Indian territory again brought the tense neighbors 
close to conflict in November 2008 when ten LeT terrorists struck the Indian city of Mumbai, 
killing 174 people and injuring 311 more.112 The attacks took place only four months after an 
attack at the Indian Embassy in Kabul, which resulted in 41 casualties.113 All of the LeT 
attackers were Pakistani nationals who planned the mission from within Pakistani Kashmir, 
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which was substantiated by the Indian government’s Congress Party based on information 
from the sole attacker captured alive.114 The international expectation following the attack 
was war, considering the escalatory nature of the Twin Peaks Crisis and the fact that the 
Mumbai attack took many more casualties, but the Mumbai reaction was much more 
subdued. Some argue India did not react strongly to the Mumbai attacks because it had not 
fully operationalized its new military doctrine Cold Start.  
The crisis reached its most dangerous point when Pakistan accused the Indian Air 
Force (IAF) of flying into Pakistani airspace over Pakistani Kashmir and even extending 
flight over the city of Lahore.115 Pakistan deemed any use of the IAF as especially escalatory 
and a sign of Indian intentions to attack. India denied the claims, calling Pakistan’s 
contention a “disinformation campaign.”116 Tensions fizzled when Indian and Pakistani 
directors of military operations met, different from the Twin Peaks crisis which lacked 
bilateral talks. India and Pakistan launched their own investigations into the Mumbai attacks 
and India released its 69-page dossier on January 5, 2009 suggesting Pakistani 
involvement.117 The United States played a vital role in respect to the dossier by publicly 
disavowing that any evidence existed linking the ISI to the Mumbai attacks, while 
simultaneously reassuring India that Pakistan would control and contain militants on its side 
of the border. Pakistan responded to the attacks with its usual routine of condemning the 
violence and rounding up the accused then subsequently releasing them once tensions 
subsided. The crisis unfolded in basically the same manner as the Twin Peaks crisis although 
it is important to note that the Indian government and Prime Minister Singh faced extensive 
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criticism from the public for once again being “soft” on Pakistan.118 Indian domestic opinion 
on how to proceed in crisis continues to grow more hawkish.  
Pathankot and Uri Attack  
 Two more smaller terror attacks followed the 2008 Mumbai attacks, but these were 
significant for the Indian response. On January 2, 2016 a terrorist attack on the Indian 
Pathankot airbase in Punjab led to the deaths of seven people. The attack was attributed to 
Pakistani protected terrorist group JeM, but a joint investigation by the two nations eased 
tensions. The same diplomatic process was not undertaken only a few months later when an 
Indian army camp in Uri (on the Indian side of Kashmir) was attacked by LeT, leaving 19 
Indian soldiers dead.119 India responded to the Uri attack of September 2016 with a military 
operation, which they termed a “surgical strike.” The surgical strike targeted terrorist outputs 
only, avoiding Pakistani military locales, but nonetheless the surgical strike is evidence of 
India’s willingness to cross the LOC and respond with military force to terrorist attacks. 
Pakistan did not acknowledge the strikes, allowing both the situation to deescalate and for a 
domestically palatable end to the situation. The Uri attack and subsequent Indian surgical 
strike led to more CFVs and tensions along the border.120 
Pulwama Attack  
On February 14, 2019 a local Indian Kashmiri suicide bomber crashed a car full of 
explosives into a group of Indian troops crossing the Kashmir Valley near the town of 
Pulwama. 40 Central Reserve Police Force officers were killed in the attack.121 Jaish-e-
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Mohammed (JeM), a group operating openly in Pakistan with close ties to the ISI, claimed 
responsibility for the attack. JeM has utilized local Kashmiris in the past to conduct terror 
attacks and this one followed the same format, even calling on Indian Muslims to “rise in 
revolt” in a video prior to the attack.122 Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan condemned 
the violence, but also made it clear Pakistan would retaliate to an Indian attack.123Indian 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, known for his tough stance on Pakistan and facing a re-
election year, wasn’t likely to let tensions blow over.124 India did respond with airstrikes on 
Tuesday morning.  
India’s Air Force entered Pakistan to strike what the government claimed was a 
training camp belonging to the Jaish-e-Mohammed militant group in Balakot, 
Khyber-Pakhtunkwha Province, resulting in “heavy casualties.” But the Pakistani 
government and residents of the area reached by telephone said the strikes instead 
struck an open ravine, resulting in minimal damage.125 
 
The Indian air strikes constituted the first time the IAF had crossed the LOC since the 1971 
Bangladesh War.126 Not only did India cross the LOC, but also the international border with 
Pakistan.127 Pakistan responded with its own airstrikes, supposedly six, on largely 
unpopulated Indian terrain. Although the strikes did not constitute a crossing of the 
international border, Pakistan jets did cross the LOC. A day after the Indian air strikes, 
Pakistan shot down one Indian fighter jet over its airspace. India proclaimed their MiG-21 
pilot missing in action and Pakistan announced the pilot was being held in Pakistani custody, 
Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman.  
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As usual the international community urged the two rivals to show restraint, including 
calls from United States’ Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to the foreign ministers of both 
nations128 and public statements from the United Nations Chief Antonio Guterres. Neither 
India nor Pakistan requested meetings with the UN Secretary General, although some 
journals reported a Pakistani request.129 The UN can do little for the conflict without some 
cooperation from either state, unlikely considering Indian mistrust of multilateral resolutions, 
and the United States role as mediator is shrinking as President Trump has moved closer to 
India and done little more than make statements regarding the current situation.130 
Apart from the normal speculation from outsiders about the possibility of a nuclear 
escalation of the conflict, it is important to note that Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan 
did meet with the National Command Authority, “the body that oversees the deployment and 
management of the country’s nuclear arms,” in the days following the initial terrorist 
attack.131 On the other hand, this most recent crisis has lacked some of the more overt nuclear 
rhetoric that the Twin Peaks Crisis and Mumbai displayed.  
Pakistan ultimately released the captured pilot as an olive branch to encourage peace 
talks with Modi’s government.132 The gesture of peace seems to have de-escalated tensions 
for the moment, although no formal talks have been held between Modi and Khan. The two 
rivals seemed to have averted war for the moment, but the lack of multilateral or bilateral 
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talks between the nations, as well as, the lucky capture of the Indian pilot are bad signs for 
future de-escalation between the rivals. The whole incident comes on the heels of a shaky 
year for Indo-Pakistani relations along the LOC. In 2017, India recorded 971 CFVs and 
Pakistan rerecorded 1,970.133 This is significantly higher than the previous year (2016 
recorded 449 and 382 respectively). Tensions between the rivals only seem to be getting 
worse.  
Important Takeaways  
In constructing crisis scenarios for Indo-Pakistani nuclear first use, it is vital to reflect 
on the patterns emanating from India and Pakistan’s history of conflict in Kashmir. Several 
patterns are worth highlighting, as they may play a role in future crisis escalation.  
Over the course of the Kashmir question, India has continually rejected a plebiscite to 
determine the status of Kashmir, stemming all the way back to the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah 
following the Delhi Accord. Likewise, India is suspicious of multilateral talks through the 
UN and continues to reject the presence of UNMOGIP as valid along the LOC. India, also, 
became suspicious of bilateral talks following the Kargil Operation, which occurred 
simultaneously with the Lahore Declaration meetings. India refused to hold bilateral talks 
during the Twin Peaks Crisis and even removed its high commissioner to Islamabad during 
this tense period. Therefore, India is likely to continue to rely on US-brokered negotiations, 
especially as US-Indian relations improve. Also pertaining to Indian assessments regarding 
Kashmir, India showed restraint during the Kargil Crisis by disavowing the use of nuclear 
weapons and never crossing the LOC into Pakistani controlled Kashmir, but this level of 
restraint may not be so permanent. India is no longer fighting the image of a nascent (and 
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possibly reckless) nuclear power. India established itself as a responsible nuclear power 
during the Kargil conflict and even benefits now from the US-Indian nuclear deal. India, 
therefore, may not feel as inclined to show restraint to elevate its international prestige. This 
is evidenced by Indian nuclear rhetoric during the Twin Peaks crisis, which was much more 
threatening than Pakistani rhetoric. Furthermore, each crisis with Pakistan in the last two 
decades has been followed by more hawkish public reactions (following Mumbai and Twin 
Peaks). The election of the hard liner Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014 may be 
evidence that the public expects a harsher military response to Pakistani provocations. 
Finally, Indian air power will continue to be a source of sensitivity for Pakistani officials. 
India’s air strike operations during the Kargil conflict were deemed a massive escalation by 
Pakistan and tensions over Mumbai in 2008 peaked when Pakistan thought the IAF had 
crossed the LOC.  
An analysis of Pakistani actions also reveals a series of patterns throughout the 
history of the Kashmir question. Pakistan has consistently made flawed assumptions about 
the international environment and the willingness of other nations to intercede on its behalf. 
Pakistan assumed the Chinese would come to their assistance, even without overt statements 
of support, during both the Second Kashmir War and the Kargil Conflict. Furthermore, 
Pakistan has wrongly assumed in the past that India would show restraint in the face of 
Pakistani provocations, specifically during the Kargil conflict. Pakistan assumed that because 
the Rann of Kutch infiltration met little Indian response that the Kargil operation wouldn’t 
either.  
 Pakistani assessment of the strategic environment has also led decision makers to act 
on closing windows of opportunity. During the Second Kashmir War, Pakistan saw its 
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window of opportunity closing to change the status quo in Kashmir with India’s plans to 
modernize following the 1962 Sino-Indian War and infiltrated Indian Kashmir. A similar 
window of opportunity logic could explain Pakistan’s surprise infiltration in 1999 during the 
Kargil conflict and raises concerns about Pakistan’s new strategic environment. Pakistan may 
evaluate its current environment, with a rising Indian military and strengthening Indo-US 
ties, as a closing window of opportunity to change the status of Kashmir. Furthermore, 
Pakistan has continually attempted to link any crises with India to the Kashmir question, as 
seen during the Kargil conflict, the Twin Peaks crisis, the Mumbai crisis, and even the 
Bangladesh War. Pakistan will most likely continue the use of Kashmiri insurgents and 
terrorists’ groups like LeT and JeM against India, considering the pattern of appeasement that 
India has resided itself to in the face of Pakistani-backed terrorism (Mumbai and Twin 
Peaks), as well as Sikh insurgents in the Punjab in the 1980s. Terrorists attacks in Indian 
administered Kashmir and Indian provinces will most likely continue as a catalyst for crises 
between the rivals.  
Finally, since the 1990 compound crisis, nuclear threats and rhetoric have been 
consistently employed by both Pakistan and India during times of tension. Although initially 
mostly a Pakistani tool of crisis management, such as during the compound crisis, the Kargil 
War, and the Twin Peaks crisis, India has also begun employing nuclear threats as a tool. 
India and Pakistan both exchanged nuclear threats and tested nuclear devices during the Twin 
Peaks and Mumbai crises. Pakistan has felt emboldened in the past to take revisionist actions 
in Kashmir because of its nuclear arsenal, but India may also be joining its ranks with a more 
aggressive nuclear posture. Chapter 5 and 6 will give a more detailed account of the 
escalatory nature of Pakistan and India’s military and nuclear doctrines. This chapter 
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concludes with a bullet point summary of the predetermined elements and major forces of 
change derived from the history of Kashmir, as well as, a timeline summary of the Kashmir 
Conflict.  
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Timeline Summary  
• 1947 Partition of the British Indian Empire  
• 1947 October First Kashmir War  
• 1949 Karachi Agreement and creation of CFL 
• 1952 July 24 Delhi Accord  
• 1962 Sino-Indian War  
• 1965 August Second Kashmir War  
• 1965 September UN Ceasefire  
• 1970 Awami League wins East Pakistan elections  
• 1971 March Bangladesh War  
• 1971 April India enters Bangladesh War  
• 1972 July Simla Agreement – creation of the Line of Control  
• 1986 Operation Brasstacks  
• 1990 Compound Crisis  
• 1998 Nuclear weapons tested 
• 1999 Kargil War  
• 2001 9/11 Attacks and Afghanistan War  
• 2001-2002 Twin Peaks Crisis  
• 2003 Ceasefire Agreement  
• 2008 September Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal  
• 2008 November Mumbai Attacks  
• 2016 Uri Attacks  
• 2019 February Pulwama suicide bomber  
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Predetermined Elements:  
 
4.1 India will continue to avoid the relegating of the Kashmir question to the UN Security 
Council, evidenced by their refusal for a UN plebiscite following both the first and second 
Kashmir Wars, and their tacit allowance of UNMOGIP to reside near the LOC, despite 
disavowing its legitimacy.  
4.2 Pakistan will continue the use of insurgents in Kashmir that started in the second Kashmir 
War and their support for anti-Indian terrorist groups, evidenced by the attacks of Twin 
Peaks, Mumbai, Pathankot, and Palwama. Pakistan will also continue the cycle of 
rapprochement, punishment, and release of terrorists following crises.  
4.3 Pakistan will continue to poorly assess the international environment. This is evidenced by 
the Kargil Operation following their Rann of Kutch assessment and their assumption of 
Chinese military support during the Second Kashmir War and the Kargil Conflict.  
4.4 Indian use of the Indian Air Force in conflict will continue to be seen as especially escalatory 
by Pakistani officials, evidenced by Operation Vijay during the Kargil Conflict, accusations 
of LOC crossing during Twin Peaks, and the Pulwama counter attack.  
4.5 Pakistan will continue linking any Indo-Pakistani conflict to the Kashmir question in an 
effort to change the status quo, evidenced by Twin Peaks and Kargil.  
4.6 Both India and Pakistan will continue the use of nuclear rhetoric in the face of regional strife, 
beginning all the way back to the 1990 Compound Crisis and continuing to the most recent 
Palwama incident.  
4.7 In order for any Indo-Pakistani terrorist provoked crisis to deescalate, India must find the de-
escalation of tensions politically face-saving, evidenced by the end of tensions during Twin 
Peaks following the satisfactory results of Kashmiri 2002 elections and the end of Palwama 
tensions following the return of pilot Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman.  
4.8 CFVs will continue to occur along the LOC, evidenced by the entirety of post-partition Indo-
Pakistani relations.  
 
Major Forces of Change:  
4.1 Pakistani assessment of a “window of opportunity” may be a source of change in the region, 
evidenced by their decision for war in 1965 on the foot of Indian military modernization. 
Similar window of opportunity thinking could occur now in the face of improving Indo-US 
relations and Indian Revolution in Military Affairs.  
4.2 Indian decisions regarding the autonomy of Kashmir may trigger change in the region, 
evidenced by the Second Kashmir War when an extension of the Indian constitution led to 
unrest and Pakistani frustration, as well as, the questionable Kashmiri elections of 1987 that 
led into the 1990 Compound Crisis.  
4.3 The changing role of the international community and the United States may destabilize the 
region, evidenced by Indo-Pakistani reliance on UN ceasefires in the first and second 
Kashmir Wars and US brokered peace during the 1990 Compound Crisis, Kargil, Twin 
Peaks, and Mumbai. 
4.4 Indian military exercises could be a source of rising insecurity in Pakistan, evidenced by the 
Brasstacks Crisis. Similarly, Indian surgical strikes like Uri and air strikes like the Pulwama 
response could escalate tensions if carried out in more vital areas or more publicly visible 
ways.  
4.5 Indian public opinion vis a vis Pakistan may become more hawkish in the coming decade, as 
evidenced by reactions to both Mumbai and Pulwama.  
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Chapter 5  
 
Indian Military Doctrine: 
Cold Start Conventional Strategy and Nuclear Credible Deterrent 
  
 55 
Introduction  
The tensions between India and Pakistan, as well as Sino-Indian skirmishes, have led 
India to embark on a Revolution in Military Affairs. India has launched a military 
modernization plan that not only aims to revamp some of the dilapidated technology used by 
the three branches of the Indian military, but also includes a new more offensive military 
doctrine. India’s growing defense budget reflects the Revolution in Military Affairs and 
contributes to growing concern that India’s emergent conventional superiority will 
destabilize the region by upsetting the Indo-Pakistani conventional balance. In 2018 India 
spent a total of $52.5 billion on defense134 and in 2017 India ranked fifth among global 
military spenders.135 Since 2008, India’s military budget has increased by a margin of 
45%.136 In this chapter, I will explore the history of India’s new offensive doctrine, titled 
Cold Start, and analyze how it is especially escalatory for Indo-Pakistani relations. An 
analysis of India’s conventional doctrine is necessary to understand the possible pathways 
through which India may initiate a conflict with Pakistan or escalate a conflict beyond 
Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. After I examine India’s conventional strategy, I will outline 
India’s nuclear policy and how it is changing. The examination of India’s nuclear policy will 
enlighten how India may be provoked to employ its ultimate weapon first during a conflict 
with Pakistan.  
History of Cold Start  
Prior to 2004, India’s military operated with a defensive doctrine titled the Sundarji 
Doctrine. The Indian military was divided into seven defensive “holding corps” and three 
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offensive “strike corps.” The defensive holding corps were located close to the Indian-
Pakistani border and the strike corps resided in central India.137 The I Corps was located in 
Mathura; the II Corps in Ambala, and the XXI Corps in Bhopal.138 Any mobilization of the 
strike corps constituted a massive conventional military operation.   
In December of 2001, the deficiencies of the Sundarji Doctrine were brought to light. 
Pakistani-backed Kashmiri militants attacked the Parliament building in New Delhi on 
December 13, 2001, a mere two months after similar attacks were made on the Kashmir state 
assembly building by Jaish-e-Mohammad.139 Five days later the Indian government launched 
Operation Parakram. The mobilization of India’s three massive strike corps consstituted the 
“largest activation of Indian forces since the 1971 Bangladesh war.”140 The mobilization 
included the movement of half a million Indian troops to the international border.141 The 
operation failed miserably, costing the Indian government $2 billion and achieving no major 
concessions from Islamabad.142 The failure of Operation Parakram stemmed mainly from the 
inability of the Indian military to quickly mobilize to the international border. It took the 
three strike corps nearly three months to reach the border, giving Pakistani President 
Musharraf ample time to “denounce terrorism in the name of Kashmir” and, thereby, 
expunge Indian justification for massive conventional retaliation.143 By the time the strike 
corps had reached the international border, Pakistan counter-mobilized and the United States, 
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with other Western powers, stepped in to deescalate the crisis. India’s inability to mobilize 
quickly, achieve strategic surprise, and utilize the holding corps for offensive operations cost 
them the chance to send a message to Islamabad that Pakistani-backed Kashmiri terrorism 
would not be tolerated. Instead India revealed the flaws of the Sundarji doctrine and the need 
for a reconceptualization of Indian military strategy. With mounting pressure from the public 
and the military establishment, after the failure of Operation Parakram, India announced its 
new military doctrine in April 2004, the so-called Cold Start doctrine.144  
Cold Start Defined 
 The announcement of Cold Start, also termed “proactive operations,”145 designated a 
break from India’s traditionally defensive military orientation and a shift to a more offensive 
posture. Cold Start, in theory, aims to assuage the flaws of Sundarji, revealed by Operation 
Parakram, including the enormous size of the strike corps, the lack of strategic surprise, the 
solely defensive nature of the holding corps, and the central location of India’s offensive 
power.146 
The goal of this limited war doctrine is to establish the capacity to launch a retaliatory 
conventional strike against Pakistan that would inflict significant harm on the 
Pakistan army before the international community could intercede, and at the same 
time, pursue narrow enough aims to deny Islamabad a justification to escalate the 
clash to the nuclear level.147 
 
Cold Start envisions the Indian military conducting a limited war with Pakistan, in which it 
“bites” and “holds” territory until Pakistan acquiesces to its demands, particularly the end of 
support for insurgency in Kashmir. To Indian military planners, Cold Start offered a good 
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alternative to a failing Sundarji doctrine, but conceptually Cold Start is particularly 
destabilizing and escalatory for Indo-Pakistani relations.  
Under Cold Start, the holding corps would be redefined as a pivot corps, capable of 
holding defensive positions and performing some offensive operations. The three strike 
corps, mobilized during Operation Parakram, would be broken up into eight Integrated Battle 
Groups (IBGs).148 IBGs would be able to operate autonomously and some would enter 
Pakistani territory within 72 hours of deployment.149 Cold Start envisions the IBGs making 
surgical strikes of 30 to 40 miles into Pakistani territory.150 The idea is that once India has 
occupied parts of Pakistani territory, the military can use the territory as a bargaining tool to 
coerce Pakistan.151 Cold Start embraces a “bite and hold strategy” for post conflict 
negotiations.  
The limited aims strategy seeks to capture a specific section of enemy territory and 
then shift to a defensive posture to repel the expected counterattack. Presented with a 
fait accompli, the defender has the choice between acquiescing or initiating an 
unattractive war of attrition to regain lost territory.152 
 
The Indian military views Cold Start as a flexible response to Pakistani provocations in 
Kashmir. In theory, utilizing the limited aims strategy of “biting and holding,” India can 
regain the power to coerce Pakistan under the nuclear umbrella. Indian military planners 
believe the limited nature of the surgical strikes into Pakistan deny “the ‘regime 
survivability’ justification for employing nuclear weapons in response.”153  
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Two other characteristics are vital to the doctrine of Cold Start: strategic surprise and 
combined arms operations. Cold Start includes employing the Indian Air Force and Indian 
Navy in support of the Integrated Battle Groups. The Indian Air Force would supply close air 
support to the IBGs in ground attack.154  Finally, Cold Start involves the Indian Army 
achieving surprise at the strategic and tactical levels.155 The Indian Army imagines a scenario 
where Pakistan will be completely caught off guard by IBG surgical strikes (strategic 
surprise) and where Pakistan will not predict the location of the attack (tactical surprise). 
Indian Army planners see the break up of the three strike corps into eight smaller IBGs as a 
step closer to achieving tactical surprise, as Pakistani intelligence will have a more difficult 
time monitoring the movements of multiple smaller army units. Strategic and tactical surprise 
are vital to any Indian incursion into Pakistan to both overcome the great advantages in 
terrain that Pakistan possesses and to avoid de-escalation from the international community 
before territorial gains can be made.  
Escalatory in Theory  
Cold Start may seem a savvy alternative to Indian Army planners who have become 
frustrated over multiple failures to respond to Pakistani state sponsored terrorism in Kashmir 
and India, but the military doctrine possesses several alarming features that will escalate any 
future crisis between India and Pakistan. Cold Start amplifies the risk of nuclear-first-use by 
India and Pakistan. Simply at the conceptual level Cold Start has several escalatory features 
including the autonomous nature of the IBGs, the rapid deployment of IBGs, the idea of 
surgical strikes, and the contradiction of achieving strategic surprise while fighting a limited 
war.  
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The autonomous nature of the Integrated Battle Groups is meant to allow for quicker 
action by the IBGs, thereby eliminating the Indian Army’s greatest mistake in Operation 
Parakram: slowness to act. Although independent IBGs may reduce action time, aiding the 
goal of rapid deployment, it also grants Army Generals more freedom on the battlefield 
outside the purview of civilian leaders. Many of the previous Indo-Pakistani crises 
deescalated largely due to the great risk aversion of Indian civilian leaders. Military generals, 
acting autonomously as the leaders of the eight IBGS, may not show the same restraint. In 
fact, according to escalation theory, the military prefers more offensive actions. By giving 
IBGs the authority to operate autonomously, the Indian military is essentially removing the 
civilian check on aggressive military action that has existed in India for decades. The military 
tendency to take more offensive action was highlighted in Operation Parakram when a corps 
commander “ordered armored elements of the II Corps to advance into assault positions near 
the international border without prior approval.”156 Without civilian leader oversight, military 
leaders can act more aggressively in the battlefield. Reorganization under Cold Start gives 
military commanders more autonomy in the field and therefore more opportunity for 
escalation.  
The rapid deployment of the Integrated Battle Groups and the Pivot Corps is 
intentionally aimed at circumventing international pressure to de-escalate a crisis. In 
Operation Parakram India learned that three weeks to reach the international border was long 
enough for Pakistan to counter mobilize and for third party nations to step in. In other words, 
India’s goal in rapidly deploying the IBGs is the elimination of international negotiations so 
that India can first “bite and hold” territory to coerce Pakistan into capitulating to certain 
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demands. The goal of rapid deployment indicates an unwillingness to negotiate and therefore 
a broken line of communication, which will increase the likelihood of nuclear-first-use by the 
escalatory mechanism of compound expectations.  
The notion that the Indian military can make surgical strikes into Pakistan of 30 to 40 
miles without threatening Pakistan to the point of nuclear use may be the most misguided 
aspect of Cold Start. Pakistan averages only 300 miles wide.157 A nation this small will 
perceive any incursion into its territory as a threat to its sovereignty. Pakistan has made it 
clear that its nuclear red lines include any infiltration into Pakistani territory. Lt. General 
Khalid Kidwai stated an Indian attack on Pakistan that includes conquering a large part of 
Pakistani territory constitutes a nuclear response.158 Extending any conflict with Pakistan 
beyond the Line of Control into Pakistani controlled Kashmir is escalatory, but moving that 
conflict beyond Kashmir, even a mere 30 miles into Pakistan, is especially sensitive since 
Pakistan’s key population centers reside close to the international border. Pakistan’s second 
largest city Lahore is a mere 15 miles from the border as well as the cities of Bahawalpur, 
Garh, Kasur, Sialkot, and Shakar.159  
Pakistani Army officers have repeatedly noted that given Pakistan’s perceived lack of 
strategic depth, there is no such thing as a limited war for Pakistan.160 
 
It is likely that Pakistan will not view an incursion into its territory as limited at all, but rather 
Pakistan will see an Indian IBG advance as a threat to its population centers and regime 
survivability, justifying an escalation to the nuclear level.  
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Cold Start presents a contradiction in that it both aims to achieve strategic and tactical 
surprise while also maintaining it is a limited war doctrine. Limited wars are difficult to 
conduct because “policymakers must overcome both internal and external pressures to 
expand the scope of a conflict.”161 Actions that seem limited to Indian officials likely will not 
receive the same classification from Islamabad. How can India keep a Cold Start operation 
limited during conflict? Indian security analyst V.R. Ragavan describes a limited war as one 
with clearly defined military and political aims with clearly articulated limits on the 
geographical boundaries of conflict, the duration of conflict, and permissible weapons of 
conflict.162 Limited war strategies depend on the assumption that the adversary will both 
understand the restrictions of the conflict as they are communicated and accept the 
limitations. Pakistan is unlikely to accept the limited nature of any conflict with India, given 
that its inferiority in conventional capabilities makes unlimited war more desirable, but also 
India may not communicate the limited nature of their operation in an effort to achieve 
strategic and tactical surprise. The goals of strategic and tactical surprise are therefore in 
contradiction with the articulation of limitations that are necessary for fighting a limited war. 
The political and military goals, as well as the constraints of duration, geography, and 
weaponry, could be communicated to the adversary after the initial operation has achieved 
strategic and tactical surprise, but this route leaves ample time for the adversary to escalate 
the conflict to the nuclear level by the mechanisms of compound expectations or inadvertent 
escalation. At the theoretical level alone Cold Start encapsulates several escalatory features 
that make the possibility for a nuclear exchange between Pakistan and India even more 
probable.  
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that India is unlikely to achieve the strategic and 
tactical surprise conceptualized by Cold Start. At the strategic level, Pakistan is likely to 
predict an attack from India based on the events leading up to an Indian retaliatory attack, 
most likely a terrorist provocation. Pakistan has 80% of its Army located close to the 
international border, prepared to rapidly counter-mobilize in the event of an Indian assault.163 
At the tactical level, the Indo-Pakistani border is characterized by difficult terrain that leaves 
few logical locations for an Indian strike. Where the Sindh and Punjab meet is considered 
Pakistan’s major point of vulnerability, but attacks could also be conducted in the flat lands 
of the Thar Desert and Rann of Kutch. India will struggle to achieve tactical surprise because 
the international border presents few options for ground attack, giving Pakistani officials a 
good probability of predicting the location of an offensive.  
Cold Start: Theory or Doctrine?   
Some argue that Cold Start is merely in the theoretical or experimental stages. Others 
argue that the Indian military has abandoned Cold Start all together. The argument that Cold 
Start is merely a theory and not truly an Indian military doctrine relies on India’s slow 
progress in implementing the necessary steps required to conduct a Cold Start-like operation 
successfully. I argue that the Indian Army has made no indication that Cold Start is not the 
reigning doctrine and has used Cold Start language in its most recent Joint Armed Forces 
Doctrine, indicating it has every intention of conducting Cold Start-like operations in the 
future. The 2017 Joint Armed Forces doctrine explicitly references making “surgical strikes” 
in response to “terror provocations,”164 which parallels the 30 to 40-mile strikes envisioned 
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by Cold Start. The document also states that the wars of the future will be “swift” and 
“short,” indicating a bite and hold strategy of limited war is possible.165 Other hints to Cold 
Start are made with language such as “network centric warfare,”166 “surprising and shocking 
the adversary,”167 “synergistic application of land, air and sea forces,” “joint operations,”168 
“centralized intent and decentralized execution,”169 and “defensive operations… will be 
offensive in conduct.”170 All of these words and phrases parallel the language of Cold Start. 
Furthermore, chief of Army Staff General Bipin Rawat publicly confirmed the existence of 
Cold Start in January 2017 stating, “The Cold Start doctrine exists for conventional military 
operations. Whether we have to conduct conventional operations for such strikes is a decision 
well thought through, involving the government and the Cabinet Committee on Security.”171 
 Skeptics may still be wary of whether India would truly risk escalation by conducting 
ground operations across the LOC, but Happymon Jacob reveals India had every intention of 
conducting cross-border incursions, even before the Army’s conceptualization of Cold Start. 
In the summer of 2001, the Indian Army formulated Operation Kabaddi, a plan to “alter the 
geography of the LOC,” with fire assaults, ambushes, and raids across the LOC. 172 
Ultimately the events of 9/11 forestalled Operation Kabaddi, but the operation is evidence 
that the Indian Army very seriously considers incursions across the LOC as a viable punitive 
measure vis a vis Pakistan and its willingness to gamble in a dangerous nuclear environment. 
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The operation gives even more reason to take seriously India’s new military doctrine, Cold 
Start.  
The Indian military has held many exercises since its 2004 announcement of Cold 
Start and the nature of these exercises gives every indication that the Indian Army is working 
towards fully materializing Cold Start. Each exercise tested a different essential aspect of 
Cold Start including rapid deployment, pivot corps offensive capabilities, integrated 
firepower, joint operations, and network-centric warfare. The repeated practicing of Cold 
Start-like operations since 2004 indicates further that the Indian Army is serious about 
responding to Pakistani-backed provocations in Kashmir with the limited war doctrine. 
Furthermore, a military doctrine, according to the Indian Army, is “a guide to action, rather 
than hard and fast rules.”173 The argument that Cold Start is merely a theory and not truly the 
Indian Army’s doctrine relies on the assumption that a doctrine requires perfect actualization. 
In a perfect world, India would have acquired every technology and completed every step 
necessary to execute a Cold Start operation, but in reality, India has demonstrated success in 
some areas of Cold Start and failure in others. I argue that India’s success in the areas of 
rapid deployment and network-centric intelligence, combined with India’s failures in the 
areas of communication, smaller formations, and jointness will heighten the already 
escalatory nature of the Cold Start doctrine in practice.  
Escalatory in Implementation 
The Indian military has shown through its military exercises since 2004 a substantial 
amount of success in rapidly mobilizing and utilizing modern intelligence technology for 
network centric warfare. In the 2006 exercise Shanghe, Shakti the II Strike Corps mobilized 
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so quickly that it successfully shaved off weeks from the time it took to reach the 
international border during Operation Parakram.174 The II Strike Corps contained nearly 50% 
of India’s offensive power at the time of the exercises, revealing the ability for India to 
rapidly deploy half of its offensive power to the Indo-Pakistani border in the event of a crisis. 
India has made strides in the decentralization of its troops as well with the creation of the 
Southwestern Command in Jaipur in 2005, which would further aide rapid deployment in the 
event of a Pakistani provocation.175 In the area of network centric warfare, India has made 
the largest strides since 2004. India has acquired more and more intelligence technology over 
the years from Israel and Russia predominantly.176 The technology, including advanced 
sensor systems and Unarmed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), has improved India’s intelligence 
capabilities. Both of these successes, in rapid deployment and intelligence, may prove more 
dangerous to the Southeast Asian region than beneficial. As already explained, rapid 
deployment presents a way for India to circumvent international pressures to show restraint 
and therefore increases the likelihood of conflict in the region. Additionally, India has failed 
to reorganize its large strike corps into smaller Integrated Battle Groups and has practiced 
rapid mobilization with the larger II Strike Corps. The failure to shrink the strike corps into 
smaller units indicates that any rapid mobilization of India’s offensive power would 
constitute a massive conventional operation, very likely to trigger more concern from 
Islamabad and general war, especially if these large strike corps are used to make surgical 
strikes into Pakistani territory. There is some speculation that detailed plans for IBGs are in 
the works, but even the smaller formations of 8,000 to 10,000 troops envisioned by Cold 
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Start constitute a massive threat to Pakistan.177 The improvement in India’s intelligence may 
open a window of opportunity for India to consider taking more aggressive preemptive 
strikes. In the past India has considered more seriously aggressive preemptive actions when 
its intelligence exceeded that of Pakistan. During the Kargil crisis Indian intelligence located 
several of Pakistan’s secret defense locations and considered taking them out.178 Similarly, 
preventive strikes were considered in the 1980s to take out Pakistan’s Kahuta nuclear 
facility.179 Improvements in Indian intelligence may give Indian officials a sense of 
confidence that encourages more aggressive escalatory behavior.  
India may also be tempted to overestimate its conventional superiority and take 
riskier decisions in the coming years as the numerical superiority grows through the 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). These risks may not play out the way India hopes. 
India’s conventional superiority is blunted by several factors including its commitment to 
protecting its border with China, the outdated state of its military hardware, and the 
geographic advantages Pakistan possesses. During the Brasstacks Crisis in 1987 skilled 
Indian Army Divisions could not be used on the Western Front because they were holding 
the Himalayan Border against Chinese skirmishes.180 18 Indian Army divisions are 
committed to states along the Western border; about the same amount of Pakistani divisions 
stationed close to the international border.181 Indian miscalculation of its superiority may 
accelerate the assessment that a Cold Start operation could succeed.  
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 India has illustrated very little success in the area of joint operations as well. India’s 
three military branches have historically rivaled for primacy within the military complex, 
especially the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force. Cold Start requires synergy between the 
branches to conduct joint operations, specifically ones that involve ground battle with air 
support. India took one step toward jointness with the creation of the Integrated Defense 
Staff in 2001, but no appointment for Chief of Defense has been made.182183 It is unlikely that 
India will overcome its deficiency in joint operations capabilities in the near present 
considering the Air Force’s sensitivity to playing a subordinate role, the Indian Army’s 
independent formulation of the Cold Start doctrine, and the military’s failure at jointness 
during the Divya Astra exercises of 2004.184 The inability of the Indian military to coordinate 
a joint operation speaks to the larger issue of communication, specifically communication 
among military branches. During a conflict, the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force must 
work together to ensure each is taking the least escalatory measure to keep the war limited. If 
the Indian Air Force fears subordination by the Indian Army during a Cold Start operation, it 
may aim to take on a greater role in the conflict than the support role the Indian Army 
formulated for it. Any action by the Indian Air Force, outside of ground support, will be 
especially sensitive to Pakistan since India possesses a “1.9:1 advantage over the Pakistan 
Air Force… (and) an even greater advantage in modern aircraft… a 2.6:1 ratio.”185 During 
the 1999 Kargil Crisis, the use of India air power was perceived in Pakistan as a gross 
overreaction and escalatory measure.186 
                                                        
182 Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?” 179. 
183 “Asia,” The Military Balance, 260.  
184 Joshi, “India’s Military Instrument,” 526.  
185 Ladwig, “Indian Military Modernization,” 754. 
186 Tellis, “Limited Conflicts under the Nuclear Umbrella,” 15. 
 69 
The issue of escalation due to faulty lines of communication goes beyond 
communication between branches, and extends to communication within Army command to 
officers in the field. As stated above, one reason Cold Start raises the risk of escalation is the 
autonomy given to officers in the field. Not only does India lack the 3.3-gigahertz of 
bandwidth necessary to conduct a major military operation in South Asia, but it also has a 
large deficiency in skilled officers.187 The lack of skilled officers makes autonomous action 
by the offensive units performing surgical strikes riskier. India’s attempt to conduct a limited 
mobile war with unskilled officers presents a recipe for disaster. The complicated terrain 
along the Indo-Pakistani border further hampers communication. It is especially true across 
the Line of Control in the areas of Jammu south of the Pir Panjal mountain range and the 
Kashmir valley because the difficult terrain and absence of transportation infrastructure 
“hinders the ability to concentrate forces, control dispersed units, and marshal reinforcements 
and supplies.”188 In implementing a Cold Start operation India risks allowing an officer in the 
field to escalate a crisis to the point that either Pakistan or India employs a nuclear weapon.  
Nuclear Doctrine 
Before analyzing India’s military doctrine, it is vital to establish that Kashmir is an 
issue within Indian military planning worth discussion at the strategic level. In the most 
recent Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces, the importance of a secure external 
environment to ensure the tranquility of India’s internal environment is stressed significantly. 
In other words, India fears the proxy war in Kashmir may spread insurgency too other areas 
of India (compound escalation). Furthermore, the document makes explicit reference to the 
need to protect the Line of Control “with effective deterrent capabilities both conventional 
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and nuclear”189 and to defend against State sponsored terrorist organizations. The continued 
reference throughout the document, coming from the strategic level of Indian military 
planning, indicates that the proxy war in Kashmir remains an issue of the highest priority in 
India and requires thinking at the nuclear decision level. 
India has traditionally stated a nuclear no first use policy, defined as “minimum 
credible deterrent.” The phrase minimum credible deterrent has been a part of India’s official 
policy since its first drafted nuclear doctrine in 1999.190 In the 2017 Joint Doctrine of the 
Indian Armed Forces, the language of a “minimum credible deterrent” was dropped for 
“credible deterrent.”191 The omission of the word “minimum” may seem marginal, but 
considering India’s 18-year history describing its nuclear posture as a “minimum credible 
deterrent,” the omission cannot be taken lightly. The change in language may indicate India’s 
movement towards a more aggressive nuclear doctrine, one that leaves room for considering 
nuclear first use in certain circumstances. Additionally, India’s NFU policy is further eroded 
by its stated willingness to use nuclear weapons in response to biological or chemical 
weapons.192 A reconceptualization of India’s NFU policy was pronounced in 2011 when the 
issue reached Parliament. Jaswant Singh, India’s former external affairs and defense minister, 
argued “the policy framework that the National Democratic Alliance devised in 1998 is very 
greatly in need of revision because the situation that warranted the enunciation of ‘no first 
use’… has long been overtaken by events.”193 Although the discussion resulted in no 
dramatic changes to India’s no first use policy, it highlights the growing discontent among 
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Indian leaders and populace with the NFU declaration. The main attraction to a declaratory 
NFU policy is that it has garnered India international prestige in the past two decades, 
especially with the restraint India demonstrated during the Kargil Crisis by refusing to issue 
strategic level threats. Now that India is regarded in a more favorable international light and 
has established a positive relationship with the United States, it may be more willing to 
consider alternative policies or at last critical exceptions to its NFU policy.  
India possesses anywhere from 130 to 140 nuclear weapons.194 This number is likely 
to grow in the years to come with the addition of six fast breeder reactors.195 India has 
transitioned over the years from stressing the “minimum” aspect of its nuclear posture to 
emphasizing the “credible” part. This transition is reflected in the force restructuring of its 
nuclear capabilities. India has always emphasized the strategic nature of nuclear weapons and 
has denounced Pakistan’s view that the weapons could be utilized for war fighting purposes, 
but India’s recent force developments may indicate a shift in logic. India’s development of 
short-range missiles such as the Prahaar Brahmos and the Nirbhay, as well as India’s 
experimentation with Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MRVs) illustrate 
its willingness to reconsider nuclear weapons as war fighting machines in response to 
Pakistani tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) developments.196 The short-range Prahaar Brahmos 
and Nirbhay missiles, with 150 kilometer and 1000 kilometer ranges respectively, mirror the 
tactical nuclear weapons being developed on India’s western border. One retired Indian 
officer described the Prahaar “as providing a nuclear warfighting option.”197 Currently the 
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Prahaar and Nirbhay missiles are not viable to be mounted with nuclear warheads, but steps 
are being made to make them dual capable. The Prahaar needs a smaller load and India is 
working to miniaturize the warheads.198 The Nirbhav is a Russian design, but India is rapidly 
working on an indigenous version.199 Once completed, the dual capable nature of the Nirbhay 
and Prahaar will make India more susceptible to inadvertent escalation. Likewise, even if the 
missiles are mobilized for solely conventional missions, their dual capability may contribute 
to compound expectations by confusing Pakistani intelligence about the nature of the 
missiles.  
The missiles could also signal a willingness to undertake conventional counterforce 
missions. Shivshankar Menon, a former Indian National Security Advisor, published a 
memoir in 2016  titled, Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy which, 
“suggest(ed) Indian interest in counterforce targeting, even including preemptive 
counterforce strikes.”200201 The continued acquisition of short-range missiles, miniaturization 
efforts for warheads, and a growing public demand for more aggressive nuclear force posture 
suggests that Pakistan may not be the only South Asian nation considering TNWs and 
counterforce strategies. India has always proclaimed a policy of massive retaliation, but the 
growing interests in counterforce strategies illustrates a shift to a more flexible response 
including the possibility of nuclear weapons with war fighting capabilities. A counterforce 
strategy becomes especially tempting when considering the case of using a missile on 
Pakistani TNWs in a preemptive counterforce strike. India is no stranger to considering 
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preemptive strikes on Pakistani nuclear infrastructure and advocates of the NFU policy are 
beginning to ponder the addition of preemption as critical point of NFU dissidence.  
MIRVs also exemplify a higher risk of escalation. In 2013 the Defense Research 
Development Organization announced plans for equipping its Agni missiles with MIRVs.202 
India’s Agni missiles are being modified to host MIRVs.203 As their name describes MIRVs 
allow for one ballistic missile to be loaded with several nuclear warheads on its bus. MIRVs 
are especially appealing for averting ballistic missile defenses. Reliance on MIRVs is a risky 
step for Indian military planners because it equates to locating a larger quantity of nuclear 
weaponry in one place, therefore making a counterforce strike even more devastating. For 
example, if an Indian ballistic missile loaded with MIRVs was hit in a counterforce strike, 
India’s nuclear forces would be significantly reduced. MIRVs increase the risk of a 
decapitating counterforce strike. Furthermore, India’s use of MIRVs points once again to the 
possibility that India’s thinking about nuclear weapons has shifted to a more accepting view 
of war fighting flexible response strategies.  
In the event of a nuclear strike, India would most likely rely on its aircrafts as 
delivery vehicles because of their high level of reliability. The Jaguar IS/IB and the Sukhoi 
Su-30MKI are both Indian nuclear capable aircraft, as well as the Mirage 2000H.204205The 
Jaguar IS/IB is positioned closest to India’s western border at the Ambala Air Force Station, 
a mere 525 kilometers from Islamabad.206 The Jaguar relies on nuclear gravity bombs.207 
India also has recently invested in developing a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), which 
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could prove beneficial in the face of a Pakistani or Chinese counter-value attack on India’s 
major population centers, but could also prove escalatory. The BMD system may contribute 
to India’s rising sense of superiority and encourage it to take more aggressive military action 
with the notion that India’s key population centers would be somewhat shielded from a 
Pakistani counter-aggression. 
Finally, it is important to consider that as India continues to respond to Pakistani 
provocations, it must also consider its powerful neighbor to the North, China. Pakistan is not 
the only nation locked in a territorial struggle with India as China fights along the 
Himalaya’s at the Line of Actual Control border with India. The dual threat to India demands 
very different responses from Indian military planners and Vipin Narang suggests India may 
be separating its nuclear strategy towards China from its nuclear strategy vis a vis Pakistan. 
Narang refers to this separation as a “decoupling of Indian nuclear strategy between China 
and Pakistan.”208 India’s nuclear forces are certainly structured to meet the demands of both 
their Western and Northern frontiers. India’s newer Agni missiles including the road mobile 
5000-kilometer range Agni-V clearly indicates a position towards China with its longer 
range; whereas the shorter range missiles such as the Prahaar indicate a Pakistani focus. The 
DRDO’s continuing interest in making its long-range ICBMs operational does hint at its 
growing interest in balancing Chinese aspirations, but it does not detract from their wariness 
of their Western neighbor Pakistan. In fact, as Narang argues the ability to shape Indian 
nuclear policy with different force structures towards China and Pakistan may allow India to 
act more aggressively toward Pakistan. The decoupling of India’s nuclear policy could allow 
India to maintain credibility as a responsible nuclear power vis a vis China with declared 
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NFU, while also pursuing more offensive nuclear capabilities such as short-range missiles, 
MIRVs, and a BMD vis a vis Pakistan. Decoupling India’s nuclear policy with its two 
adversaries leaves open the option for Indian nuclear first use against Pakistan in a 
preemptive attack.  
India’s nuclear arsenal is directed by the civilian body the Nuclear Command 
Authority (NCA) and the military body the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). There is some 
concern in India that the SFC may be working more autonomously than envisioned by the 
NCA because of the growing disconnect between India’s stated minimum deterrent policy 
and the actualization of India’s force structure.209 Although India’s civil-military command 
and control structure is much less a concern than Pakistan’s C&C, it is still worth keeping an 
eye on as India’s arsenal continues to contradict its doctrine.  
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Predetermined Elements: 
5.1 India will continue pursuing a reconceptualized military strategy that includes surgical 
strikes, limited war logic, and the goals tactical and strategic surprise, evidenced by the 
Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces and the military exercises conducted since 
2004.  
5.2 The Indian military will become more autonomous of civilian controls, evidenced by the 
autonomy granted by Cold Start doctrine to officers in the field and he disjuncture 
between the Indian Nuclear Weapons program headed by SFC and civilian leader’s 
emphasis on “minimum” deterrence.  
5.3 The Indian military is unlikely to achieve strategic surprise in conducting a surgical strike 
and Pakistan will not see a limited bite and hold strategy as nonthreatening to Pakistani 
sovereignty.  
5.4 Indian forces will continue to be constrained by their dual responsibilities defending the 
Himalayan border with China and the International border with Pakistan. 
5.5 Kashmir will continue to constitute an issue worthy of Indian strategic planning, as 
evidenced by India’s nuclear rhetoric throughout the history of the Kashmir conflict and 
Kashmir’s presence in the Joint Doctrine of 2017.  
5.6 India will continue developing a nuclear strategy vis a vis Pakistan, evidenced by their 
development of short-range missiles.  
 
Major Forces of Change:  
5.1 An Indian Cold Start operation may successfully achieve rapid mobilization at the cost of 
time for international de-escalation, evidenced by military exercises and new military 
infrastructure close to the LOC.  
5.2 The success of a Cold Start operation may be hindered by the lack of communication 
between branches, specifically the Air Force.  
5.3 India may feel overconfident in its intelligence capabilities and consider pre-emptive 
strikes on Pakistan, evidenced by their consideration of pre-emptive strikes in 1980 on 
Pakistan’s Kahuta nuclear facility and during the Kargil Conflict.  
5.4 India’s No First Use nuclear policy may be reconceptualized in the coming years, 
evidenced by growing demands within the government for a reversal of NFU, changing 
language from “minimum credible deterrent” to “credible deterrent,” and more defined 
exceptions to NFU. 
5.5 Indian nuclear forces may become more aggressive towards Pakistan, evidenced by the 
development of short-range missiles, MIRVs, and BMD. Furthermore, the risk of 
inadvertent escalation will increase with these developments, especially with regard to 
possibly dual capable missiles like the Nirbhay and Prahaar. 
  
 77 
Chapter 6 
 
Pakistani Military Strategy: 
Balancing the Conventional Threat to the East 
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Unlike India, Pakistan’s conventional military doctrine has changed very little in 
recent years and, therefore, it requires a less thorough analysis. Although its conventional 
strategy has remained consistent over the past two decades, Pakistan’s nuclear posturing has 
shifted in response to the changing international environment. This chapter will explore both 
the escalatory nature of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, as well as Pakistan’s conventional 
strategy of “bleeding India by a thousand cuts.”210 
Military Regime  
The Pakistani military has been the greatest authority in Pakistan for most of its 
history and often claims to be the ‘savior of Pakistan.211 Pakistan blames India for its 
inability to fully implement its constitutional democracy, both for India’s refusal to hand over 
Indian controlled Kashmir and its part in severing the nation in two through the 1971 
Bangladesh war.212 The country has faced numerous coups and most recently the resignation 
of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif amid corruption charges.213 The failure of the civilian 
government to fully materialize, evidenced by the failure of any Pakistani civilian 
government to be elected twice consecutively214, has allowed the Pakistani army to justify its 
intervention and involvement into civil affairs. Even in 2008 and 2015 when Pakistan 
switched to a nominally civilian government,215 the Army remained the chief authority on 
military matters and control over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has never shifted to civilian 
control.216  
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On matters of national security, the well-recognized entrenched civil-military balance 
between elected officials and senior military is often clearly in evidence. A major 
token of civilians yielding of political space to the military came with the 
government’s acceding to the military’s demand for judicial authority in terrorism 
related cases.217 
 
In fact, the civilian leadership of Pakistan is often left in the dark on Pakistani 
military decisions. During the Kargil Crisis of 1999, the Pakistani army began contingency 
plans for a nuclear strike without informing the Pakistani leadership.218 The lack of civilian 
oversight regarding military matters in Pakistan is a concern according to escalation theory. 
The military favors the offensive and is more willing to take aggressive action in times of 
conflict. Pakistan illustrated this phenomenon clearly when the civilian government called for 
a nuclear policy of No First Use (NFU), and it was resolutely rejected by the Army. 
Furthermore, the incident during Kargil points to the deficiency of strategic level planning in 
Pakistan. Pakistan’s narrow focus at the tactical level may lead to decision making without 
considering the strategic level consequences.219 Just as the Pakistani Army failed to consult, 
or even inform, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif prior to alerting its nuclear forces during the 
Kargil conflict in 1999, the Pakistani Army may continue to take aggressive steps during 
future crises with India without a civilian check on military power.220 
Pakistan has been known to take more aggressive actions towards India in the past 
when its leadership has felt emboldened by the international community and its nuclear 
arsenal. Pakistan’s relationship with the United States has changed greatly from the time 
Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapon in 1998 to present day.  
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During the Cold War, Pakistan’s geographic proximity to the erstwhile Soviet Union 
and China and its location… attracted the United States to seek Pakistani alliance in 
the “containment” of the Communist bloc.221 
 
In the late 1980s, at the height of Pakistan’s nuclear program development stages, 
Pakistan faced little criticism for going nuclear mainly because of its vital importance in 
fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. Pakistan was central to the United States’ mission in 
Afghanistan and, therefore, American leadership turned a blind eye to Pakistani 
provocations. Pakistan, feeling emboldened by U.S. support and in an effort to “exploit its 
newly confirmed nuclear capabilities” began the Kargil operation in Spring 1999. Pakistan’s 
good relations with the United States and its nuclear capability gave it the wrongful 
impression that the international community would understand and empathize with the Kargil 
Operation as an extension of Siachen, which Pakistan views as an illegal occupation.222  
Today Pakistan’s relationship with the United States is ever more complex. The 
attacks of September 11th on the New York World Trade Center led the U.S. to funnel over 
$2 billion per year to Pakistan to train anti-Taliban forces. Pakistan capitalized on this 
relationship by funneling much of the U.S. assistance to anti-Indian jihad groups.223 At the 
same time, the 9/11 attacks put the United States at odds with Pakistan, regarding its 
conflicting agenda with the U.S. “war on terror.” The complex U.S.-Pakistani relationship 
deserves more thorough analysis, but for the purpose of this paper it is sufficient to 
understand how U.S. assurances emboldened Pakistan.  
Pakistan has a history of misreading the international environment and taking more 
aggressive actions when it deems it favorable to Pakistan. Therefore, any demonstration of 
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support from the United States, China, or otherwise may lead Pakistan to take “destabilizing 
actions intended to exploit that support.”224 Similarly if Pakistan estimates a great advantage 
in its nuclear arsenal vis-à-vis India, it may deem its nuclear weapons as a source of 
impunity, enabling Pakistan to take more aggressive actions.  
Conventional Doctrine  
 Pakistan’s conventional doctrine is one of “offensive defense.”225 Offensive defense 
envisages quick and decisive, even possibly disproportionate, counterattacks in response to 
Indian provocations. Pakistan is positioned well to defend its Western border with 80% of its 
Army divisions (18 out of 22) stationed in provinces along the international border.226 These 
units are mostly forward deployed and benefit from natural defensive fortifications along the 
international border. Although Pakistan lags behind India in conventional power, it is 
advantaged both by the terrain along the Indo-Pakistani border, favorable to the defense, and 
shorter lines of communication.227 Although Pakistan is positioned well to defend its 
territory, changing the status quo in Kashmir requires offensive action. Pakistan has mainly 
utilized human resources outside of its own army to prosecute these offensive acts, 
specifically “religiously motivated militant forces.”228 
Pakistan’s conventional strategy over the past several years has been to support the 
insurgency in Kashmir and terrorists’ groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, 
and Harkat-ul-Ansar in an effort to tire the Indian Army into making concessions.229 
Pakistan’s low intensity conflict (LIC) strategy views the continued amplification of 
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subconventional conflict in Kashmir and beyond in India, as a legitimate means of pressuring 
India to negotiate. The strategy of “bleeding India by a thousand cuts” relies on Pakistan’s 
nuclear capabilities supplying impunity from Indian retaliation to continue conducting low 
intensity aggressions.230  
For Pakistan, sponsoring terrorism, which it calls the freedom struggle, is a cheap 
strategy that allows plausible deniability to compel India to make concessions on 
Kashmir.231 
 
The strategy of supporting jihad to achieve strategic goals such as the re-delineation 
of Kashmir has benefitted Pakistan in several ways. First, Pakistan lacks a “coherent 
founding narrative” as a homeland for South Asian Muslims, exacerbated by Muslims living 
in Indian controlled Kashmir. The acquisition of Kashmir could help Pakistan bolster its 
Islamic identity and encourage “the notion that South Asian statehood should be determined 
on the basis of religion.”232 Supporting jihad has become one way for Pakistan to cement its 
national identity as an Islamic state in the wake of the Kashmir question. Secondly, the use of 
religious militants has been especially desirable to Pakistan as a state which at its 
independence had serious security concerns and serious weaknesses materially and 
politically. At the partition of the British Indian Empire in 1947, Pakistan received less than 
18% of British India’s financial resources.233 Pakistan’s deficiencies in material and 
manpower made Army Col. Akbar Khan’s strategy of “armed revolt inside Kashmir” 
desirable to Pakistani leaders that were especially sensitive to large scale losses in direct 
confrontation with India.234  
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Pakistan’s long relationship with militants began directly after partition during the 
first Kashmir War when Pakistan trained and armed local Kashmiri rebels and Afridi 
tribesman in the hopes of overthrowing the maharaja, referring to their attack on Kashmir as 
“jihad.”235 The First Kashmir War “demonstrated that nonstate actors could enable Pakistan 
to challenge India in a manner that limited the prospect of direct military confrontation.”236 
Pakistan employed militants again in the Second Kashmir war in 1965, but strayed away 
from the use of militants during the Bangladesh War in 1971. It then used regular forces in 
direct confrontation with India and by the end had lost East Pakistan, which exacerbated both 
the confusion of Pakistan’s founding narrative and its’ lack of strategic depth. The 
Bangladesh War increased Pakistani wariness of direct military confrontation with India and 
increased its reliance on religious militants.  
Since then, Pakistan’s strategy of supporting jihad has both increased and become 
more complicated. Pakistan used the Afghanistan War to its advantage in Kashmir by 
funneling United States’ funds for training anti-Taliban militants into the Jammu and 
Kashmir Liberation Front.237 Pakistan pressured the JKLF throughout the late 80s to carry 
out destabilizing actions in Kashmir such as the bombings in Srinagar in July 1988.238 
Pakistan replaced the JKLF with the Hib-ul-Mujahideen because the JKLF envisioned 
independence for Kashmir and did not want Kashmir joined to Pakistan. The Hib-ul-
Mujahideen were also soon replaced by non-Kashmiri Islamist militants. The Hib-ul-
Mujahideen, as Kashmiris, were more hesitant to carry out violent attacks on fellow 
Kashmiris, whereas the new class of non-Kashmiri Islamist militants, such as Lashkar-e-
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Taiba, held no such reservations. By thee 1990s, these groups of non-Kashmiri militants 
became the main proxy forces for Pakistan, carrying out attacks in both Kashmir and the 
Indian homeland.239  
In the last twenty years Pakistan has faced three major crises with India… The 
stimulus for each of these crises was an attack on Indian forces or territory by a 
militant group operating from within Pakistan’s borders, aided covertly or overtly by 
Pakistan’s defense establishment.240 
 
A major issue stemming from Pakistan’s strategy of utilizing radical groups for low 
intensity conflict is the principal-agent problem. Pakistan has no way of ensuring their 
terrorists agents act according to Pakistan’s strategic interests.241 These groups view 
themselves as “the vanguard of a worldwide Islamist resurgence,” and therefore are not likely 
to stop at the orders of their Pakistani principals.242 Some militant groups have become so 
powerful within Pakistan that they threaten the authority of Pakistan’s central government. 
Pakistan has fallen into the familiar pattern in the past decade of cracking down on terrorism 
within its borders, specifically following international pressure, only to ease up once national 
attention wanes. Pakistan has conducted several campaigns against terrorist organizations 
operating within its borders, specifically its tribal belt, since 2001, not so coincidentally 
following the 9/11 attacks. The campaigns usually follow the same pattern of first signing 
some peace deal with insurgent leaders in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), 
then realizing peace would not hold, launching a campaign, but only targeting “bad jihadis.” 
Pakistan has continually protected “good jihadis”: the anti-Indian groups that focus their 
energies on disrupting peace in India and Indian controlled Kashmir.  
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For example, in 2005 Pakistan signed a peace deal with Baitullah Mehsud, leader of 
the militants in South Wazistran.243 Soon after the peace deal Mehsud announced his 
leadership over Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) and began carrying out suicidal bombing campaigns 
across Pakistan, including the 2007 assassination of Benazir Bhutto.244 In the army campaign 
that followed, Operation Zalzala, Pakistan targeted Mehsud militants only and left terrorists’ 
camps terrorizing areas of Afghanistan and Kashmir untouched. Pakistan also failed to kill 
much of the leadership of TTP, which allowed the militants to re-infiltrate many parts of 
South Waziristan following the operation’s “success” in May.245 The army carried out similar 
operations in other FATA regions and often left little more than grazed destroyed villages to 
be re-inhabited by militants at a later date. Operations included Sher Dill in 2008, Rah-e-
Nijat in 2009, Rah-Haq in 2007-2009, and Zarb-e-Azb in 2014. Currently 13 groups “operate 
under the banner of Tehrik-e-Taliban.”  
Although some of Pakistan’s issues with militants arose naturally from the Afghan 
wars of the 1980s and 90s, as well as the U.S. operations in Afghanistan following 9/11, 
militancy has flourished in Pakistan through the state’s willing accommodation of these 
organizations. Pakistan has allowed them to spread their radical message freely while also 
allowing easy access to money and weaponry. Pakistan’s inability to rout out insurgency is 
directly related to its relationship with India and Kashmir. Pakistan refuses to put its full 
military potential into suppressing militants because its primary focus is its Eastern border 
with India, but also because Pakistan relies on their “good jihadis” to conduct Low intensity 
conflict in Indian administered Kashmir and beyond. Pakistan resorts to “cracking down on 
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militants” when necessary to deescalate tensions with India, but rarely attacks jihadi 
leadership or anti-Indian organizations like LeT and JeH. Furthermore, Pakistan has 
attempted to outlaw certain jihadi groups, 212 over the past 15 years to be exact, and yet 
these “banned groups” face little punishment and usually rebrand themselves to evade legal 
repercussions.246  
Many of the very forces responsible for domestic violence and that aspire to bring 
conceivably existential change to Pakistan are the ones that the state has itself 
unleashed. They were launched and nurtured in the state’s use of militant groups as 
strategic pieces in an India-centric foreign policy that employed surrogates to carry 
out Pakistan’s policies in Kashmir and Afghanistan.247 
 
 The militants are becoming more powerful and therefore less likely to acquiesce to 
Pakistan’s strategic interests and India is becoming increasingly impatient with Pakistan’s 
halfhearted efforts to quell terrorism in the region. Pakistan risks great escalation with India 
by using these radical terrorists’ organizations as their fighting force in the subconventional 
conflict they are waging in Kashmir. Furthermore, Pakistan has claimed that much of the 
terrorist activity within their borders is orchestrated by India’s intelligence agency Research 
and Analysis Wing (RAW) in an effort to destabilize the Pakistani government.248 Pakistan 
may rely on this narrative to justify their low intensity conflict in Kashmir and portray 
themselves as the victim vis a vis India. By relying on jihad in Kashmir, Pakistan may not 
have control over the initial attacks that spark an Indian counter-response, but they may be 
held responsible for fighting the war that follows.  
Pakistan’s reliance on Islamic militant groups does not preclude its preparation for a 
full-scale military confrontation with India. Pakistan, like India, conducts military exercises 
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regularly to prepare for a regional clash. Four Azm-Nau (New Resolve) tri-service exercises 
were held between 2009 and 2013, all configured specifically in response to India’s Cold 
Start doctrine.249 Pakistan’s forces include the army, the Frontier Corps, and the Frontier 
Constabulary and Frontier police.250 Pakistan has made clear that its army will continue to 
configure versus India and will “not become a counter-insurgency force.”251 Despite 
Pakistan’s war within, India remains the primary focus of Pakistan’s army not only for 
external security purposes, but also because many Pakistanis in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA), where insurgency flourishes, view the largely Punjabi army as an ally 
of Western powers like the U.S.252 For these reasons the Frontier Constabulary has been 
tasked with the most responsibility in quelling insurgency in FATA and the conventional 
Army remains focused on India. As insurgency in FATA and the rest of Pakistan becomes 
more of an issue, Pakistan may need to move some of its army resources into counter 
insurgency roles, even if it is not ideal. A shift of conventional forces along Pakistan’s 
Eastern border with India may further disrupt the conventional balance and lead Pakistan to 
rely even more on its nuclear arsenal for deterrence.  
Nuclear Doctrine 
Pakistan recognizes India’s Revolution in Military Affairs and its own inability to 
match Indian defense spending. Pakistani officials also believe Western power “tacitly 
endorse India’s strategic ambitions and military investments as a means of containing 
China’s rise,”253 which Pakistan sees as destabilizing for the region. Gregory Koblentz refers 
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to this situation as a “security trilemma.”254 India’s military modernization, even if motivated 
by China, has disrupted the conventional balance that has existed between India and Pakistan 
for decades. Pakistan’s smaller size and stagnant economy have led strategic planners to 
consider more unconventional ways to counter the growing military threat posed by India. As 
India continues to grow its conventional superiority over Pakistan, Islamabad seeks to 
counterbalance India with a more diverse nuclear arsenal. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 
program, beginning in the 1970s,255 has been one of two things that “cements national 
solidarity” in Pakistan (the other being the Kashmir insurgency).256 Pakistan’s nuclear build 
up is both a result and cause of its conventional inferiority. Pakistan has resorted to 
stockpiling nuclear weapons as a cheap solution to its inferiority vis a vis India, but at the 
same time “the funds spent on tactical nuclear weapons have not been available to spend on 
conventional capabilities.”257 Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has become both a saving grace and 
the cause of stagnation for Pakistani security.  
Pakistan describes its nuclear strategy towards India as a “full spectrum deterrence 
posture.”258 In other words, Pakistan considers all possible options in the event of a 
conventional Indian threat as legitimate, including using tactical nuclear weapons. Even 
before “full spectrum deterrence” was articulated as Pakistan’s doctrine, Pakistani officials 
viewed nuclear weapons as a deterrent to more than simply nuclear attacks. Dating back to 
Pakistan’s first nuclear tests in 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stated “these weapons are 
to deter aggressions, whether nuclear or conventional.”259 Pakistan has continued to believe 
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nuclear weapons provide a deterrent to several threats: nuclear and conventional. In 2009, a 
spokesman for Pakistan’s Foreign Office expressed that continued military build up by India 
will lower Pakistan’s nuclear threshold.260 Concentrating on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal offers 
a cheaper and more realistic option for balancing India’s large conventional forces.  
Vipin Narang terms Pakistan’s “full spectrum of deterrence” as a nuclear asymmetric 
escalation posture.261 Prior to India’s 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistan relied on a catalytic nuclear 
posture, which used nuclear threats as a catalyst for ally intervention. For example, in 1990 
Pakistan and India came to the brink of war when India deployed infantry units to Punjab and 
Kashmir in response to Pakistani support to Kashmiri insurgents.262 As the crisis seemed to 
be spiraling towards war with both Pakistani and Indian Army units forward deployed along 
the Line of Control, Pakistan “signaled to the United States… that it was preparing to use its 
nuclear capabilities.”263 Pakistan’s coded nuclear signals successfully catalyzed the United 
States into sending a diplomat to deescalate the crisis.  
Pakistan has shifted in recent years away from the catalytic nuclear posture likely for 
three reasons. First, Pakistan has gradually realized the catalytic posture, even when 
successful in catalyzing third party involvement, does not always end with an advantageous 
arrangement. This point is particularly potent because it highlights Pakistan’s growing 
weariness and mistrust of international mediators in crisis. Secondly, India’s 1998 nuclear 
tests, as well as India’s continued conventional build up, encouraged Pakistan to take a more 
aggressive approach regarding nuclear doctrine. Thirdly, the United States has shifted its 
focus away from Pakistan in recent years as a result of both Pakistani-sponsored terrorism 
                                                        
260 Ladwig “Indian Military Modernization,” 731.  
261 Narang, “Posturing for Peace?” 38. 
262 Ibid, 53.  
263 Ibid.  
 90 
and the reduced need for Pakistani assistance following the reduction of troops in 
Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Kargil War isolated Pakistan from the international 
community and confirmed to Pakistan that allies, specifically China during the Kargil crisis, 
cannot be relied upon as a balance to Indian conventional superiority. All of these 
developments factored into Pakistan’s decision to shift to a nuclear asymmetric escalation 
posture.  
The asymmetric escalation posture includes the rapid first use of nuclear weapons in 
response to a conventional attack. Nuclear weapons, therefore, become more than strategic 
weapons, gaining tactical capabilities as “usable warfighting instruments.”264 Asymmetric 
Escalation Posture envisions Pakistan responding to Indian aggression by intensifying a 
conflict to the nuclear dimension. It requires Pakistan’s development of more tactical nuclear 
weapons and a continued first use policy. The escalatory posture threatens India with a 
nuclear response to any Indian provocation, therefore, giving Pakistan the impunity to 
continue its conventional strategy of low intensity conflict.  
Asymmetric escalation… has created a vicious cycle where elements within Pakistan 
feel emboldened to more aggressively seek long standing limited revisionist aims 
through subconventional or terrorists’ attacks.265 
 
There is an important distinction between Pakistan’s old catalytic nuclear posture and its 
newer asymmetric escalation posture. Under the catalytic posture, Pakistan made threats to 
entice a third party to intervene in a conflict to deescalate the situation. The threats of a 
catalytic posture are aimed at a third party. In fact, the signals that the United States received 
during the 1990 Compound Crisis that Pakistan was preparing its nuclear arsenal were not 
recoverable by Indian intelligence. The “threat” was truly meant for the United States. In a 
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way the catalytic nuclear posture is indirect deterrence, utilizing a third party. On the other 
hand, asymmetric escalation relies on direct deterrence, whereby Pakistan directly threatens 
nuclear escalation to India. An example of asymmetric escalation at work includes the threat 
of nuclear first use during the Operation Parakram crisis in 2001 that subsequently led India 
to deescalate the crises. Not only did Pakistan issue a statement threatening the “nuclear 
option,” but it also tested three nuclear capable ballistic missiles in succession.266 
Asymmetric escalation is much more dangerous than the catalytic posture in this way 
because it envisions Pakistan making direct nuclear threats to India, and cuts out the 
opportunity for a third party to deescalate the crises, relying solely on bilateral cooperation. 
Asymmetric Escalation posture is less flexible than a catalytic posture because it entrenches 
the signaler into a commitment of first use and the ability to “save face” in de-escalation 
becomes more complicated.  
The asymmetric escalation posture is especially escalatory for Indo-Pakistani 
relations in tandem with India’s new Cold Start doctrine. As mentioned before Pakistan’s 
lack of strategic depth means any Indian incursion into Pakistani territory will constitute a 
large threat to Pakistan; therefore, according to Pakistan’s asymmetric escalation posture low 
yield nuclear weapons may be used in response to a conventional attack. Pakistani defense 
minister Khawaja M. Asif stated clearly in 2016 that if anyone encroaches on Pakistan’s 
territory Pakistan “will not hesitate to use those weapons (nuclear weapons) for our 
defenses.”267 Pakistan’s Chief Army of Staff made a similar statement with specific reference 
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to Indian Cold Start, claiming the new doctrine increases the likelihood of spiral 
escalation.268 
 Asymmetric escalation posture also increases the risk of nuclear first use by Pakistan 
through the vulnerability/invulnerability paradox.269 Asymmetric escalation necessitates the 
pre-delegation and devolution of nuclear controls.270 Rapid deployment of nuclear weapons 
is essential to an asymmetric escalation posture, but rapid deployment makes the arsenal both 
vulnerable to a counterforce attack and more likely to be employed by a Pakistani officer at 
the tactical level. The pre-assembly and pre-dispersion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons out of 
secure locations into the battlefield in a crisis makes them more visible to Indian intelligence 
and therefore more vulnerable to a decapitating counterforce attack. It has been reported that 
in areas thought vulnerable to an Indian advance such as the Punjab and Sindh provinces, 
fully assembled weapons are stored, making these better targets for a counterforce attack and 
more susceptible to use at the tactical level271 The risk of inadvertent escalation increases as 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are moved into the battlefield where an Indian strike may be 
perceived as an attempt to take out Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. Pakistan sacrifices 
centralized command and control over its nuclear arsenal by relying on an asymmetric 
posture. Officers in the field may feel the “use them or lose them” dilemma more intensely 
and be tempted to take more forceful action with tactical nuclear weapons. Although more 
security controls were implemented in Pakistan following the revelation of AQ Khan’s 
proliferation network, still more than 10,000 Pakistani officers and scientist have access to 
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Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, allowing ample opportunity for first use by an eager and hawkish 
Pakistani official.272 
Finally, incredibly important to this study is Pakistan’s First Use policy. Although 
Pakistani nuclear doctrine is not made public, Pakistan has made it abundantly clear that it is 
willing to employ nuclear weapons first or at least that it refuses to adopt a declared No First 
Use policy like India. Dr. Qadar Baksh Baloch explains the perversity of a no first use policy 
for Pakistan stating,  
Owing to Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth, imbalances in conventional forces, and 
location of its main population centers in proximity to its Easter borders, NFU nuclear 
posture could invite aggression and leave Pakistan highly vulnerable to India.273  
 
By explicitly disavowing a no first use policy, Pakistan sends the signal to India and 
the international community that it is willing to escalate a conflict to the nuclear level.274 This 
first use policy not only protects many Pakistani aggressions under the shadow of a nuclear 
first strike, but it also elevates any Indo-Pakistani conflict to the nuclear level. Lt. Gen. 
Khalid Kidwai while head of the Strategic Plans Division defined Pakistan’s nuclear red lines 
as  
India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory; India destroys a large 
part of Pakistan’s land or air forces; India blockades Pakistan in an effort to strangle it 
economically, or India pushed Pakistan into a state of political destabilization or 
creates large scale internal subversion in the country.275 
 
In tandem with India’s views on the feasibility of fighting a limited war with Pakistan, and 
specifically conducting surgical strikes into Pakistani territory, Pakistan’s nuclear redlines 
have grave implications for the region. Pakistan retains its resolve to reply to land grabs with 
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nuclear weapons and continually relays the message that its nuclear program is “India 
specific.”276 
Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) 
As of January 2018, Pakistan possessed 140-150 nuclear warheads.277 Pakistan’s 
investment in its nuclear program correlates to estimates that its nuclear weapons stockpile 
could reach 220-250 warheads by 2025,278 aided by its recent opening of a fourth plutonium 
production reactor in Khushab.279 Unlike India whose nuclear stockpile has traditionally been 
configured for massive retaliation, Pakistan is developing tactical low yield nuclear weapons 
that could be used in the battlefield for warfighting purposes.280 Pakistan even refers to its 
TNWs as battlefield nuclear weapons (BNWs).281 Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz 
Chaundry publicly stated that Pakistan did possess low yield tactical nuclear weapons, 
confirming suspicions that Pakistan sought an asymmetric escalation posture vis a vis 
India.282 
 Pakistan has several low yield short range missiles, indicating their possible use for 
warfighting. Pakistan tested the Hatf-8 and the Hatf-9 Nasr missiles in 2012, with ranges of 
350km and 60km respectively.283 Both missiles are dual capable. The Haft-9 is a land based 
ballistic missile with a multitube launcher that can launch four missiles simultaneously.284 
The Haft-3 and Haft-4 are also included in Pakistan’s arsenal and these short-range ballistic 
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missiles have the benefit of road-mobility.285 Pakistan possesses medium range missiles as 
well, the longest range system being the Shaheen-III at 2750km, but these weapons have 
little applicability for tactical use via India.286 Delivery vehicles for Pakistan’s nuclear 
warheads include the Mirage III and the Mirage V combat aircrafts that can deliver both the 
Haft-8 and nuclear gravity bombs respectively.287 Pakistan’s 40 F-16A/B combat aircrafts are 
rumored to have been modified for dual use as well.288 The Haft-8 may be the missile in 
Pakistan’s arsenal worth the most consideration because it is dual capable and has been tested 
several times since 2007.289  
Pakistan’s dual capable missiles and delivery vehicles raise concern about inadvertent 
escalation. For example, the Haft-8 missile is a short-range missile likely to be deployed in 
the battlefield, making it susceptible to a counterforce attack. Its nuclear capability makes it 
especially sensitive to Pakistani decision makers who may deem an attack on its dual capable 
missile as an attack on its nuclear second-strike capabilities. Pakistan’s decision to couple its 
conventional and nuclear arsenals may lead to inadvertent escalation. Furthermore, Nasr 
missiles “will need to be deployed to the field fully armed in order to be usable,” increasing 
the “lose them or lose them” risk discussed earlier.290 Short range missiles, like the ones in 
Pakistan’s arsenal, need to be “relatively close to the forward line of troops,”291 in order to be 
effective, risking both an annihilating counterforce strike and harm to Pakistan’s own troops.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning Pakistan’s quest for a nuclear triad, with its recent 
developments in sea-based missile platforms. Pakistan’s renewed energy in pursuing a 
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nuclear triad, to secure its second-strike capability, could be a window of opportunity for 
Indian strategic planners who adopt a “now or never” attitude regarding taking out Pakistan’s 
nuclear capabilities. Any attempt to nuclear disarm Pakistan will be made more difficult once 
they successfully incorporate sea-based platforms into their arsenal, leaving no doubt about 
their second-strike capabilities.  
As seen by Pakistan’s asymmetric escalation posture, unofficial first use policy, and 
continued development of battlefield nuclear weapons, Pakistan has an interest in keeping 
“any conflagration as unlimited as possible,”292 or at least touting the threat of unlimited 
nuclear war. Meanwhile, India has reoriented its conventional strategy to a limited war 
doctrine, hoping to limit any conflict with Pakistan from reaching the nuclear threshold. 
Pakistan and India’s conventional and nuclear doctrines together seem to be gliding towards 
collision, and one that will not easily find ground for negotiation. Pakistan’s continued 
reliance on tactical nuclear weapons as a counterbalance to India’s conventional superiority, 
in tandem with India’s newly aggressive Cold Start Doctrine, is a recipe for disaster for the 
two long time Southeast Asian rivals. 
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Predetermined Elements:  
6.1 Pakistan will continue its support of anti-Indian terrorist groups and Kashmiri insurgents to 
conduct its ongoing Low Intensity Conflict strategy vis a vis India. Pakistan also continues to 
fear direct military confrontation with India, especially evidence by their humiliating defeat 
in the Bangladesh War.  
6.2 Pakistan will continue the pattern of taking light punitive action following terrorist attacks 
that gain international attention and then subsequently releasing captured militants. This is 
evidenced by their protection of “good jihadis” and their refusal to crackdown on LeT and 
JeH leadership.  
6.3 Nuclear rhetoric will remain an important facet of Pakistani crisis management, evidenced by 
the nuclear threats following the Twin Peaks crisis and throughout the Kargil Crisis. 
Similarly, Pakistan will continue its unofficial policy of nuclear First Use, evidenced by their 
refusal since the start of their nuclear program in the 70s to declare NFU.  
6.4 The Pakistani military establishment will remain the major authority in the nation, evidenced 
most clearly by the refusal to relegate nuclear command and control to civilian authorities.  
6.5 Indian conventional superiority will continue to threaten Pakistani security and Pakistan will 
continue pursuing more affordable and unconventional strategies to balance India, including 
the development of tactical nuclear weapons.  
 
Major Forces of Change: 
6.1 The security trilemma on the continent (between India, China, and Pakistan) may further 
embolden the Indian military establishment through Western aid in an effort to balance the 
rise of China, leaving Pakistan more insecure and reliant on nuclear weapons than before. 
This is evidenced by the Indian-US nuclear deal, which has cause great concern in Pakistan.  
6.2 The principal-agent problem may worsen for Pakistan’s LIC strategy vis a vis India, leading 
to more interstate insurgency. This is evidenced by the growing power of groups like the TTP 
and Pakistan’s anti-insurgency campaigns from 2007-2009.  
6.3 India’s Cold Start doctrine may leave Pakistani planners with a closing window of 
opportunity, evidenced by statements regarding the risks of “spiral escalation” and threats 
that Pakistan’s nuclear threshold is lowered.  
6.4 Pakistan may feel emboldened by its diversifying nuclear arsenal and signs of ally-ship from 
the international community, most likely China, and be tempted to carry out more 
destabilizing military acts. This is evidenced by Pakistan’s history of misreading the 
international environment, such as during the Kargil conflict.  
6.5  Pakistan may be shifting to an asymmetric escalation posture, evidenced by their direct 
nuclear threats’ vis a vis India and their development of low yield tactical nuclear weapons.  
6.6 The risk of inadvertent escalation may be heightened with Pakistan’s pre-delegation and pre-
devolution of nuclear weapons as more officers at the tactical level have control and India 
has the ability to preemptively take out nuclear weapons deployed in the battlefield. 
Similarly, Pakistan’s Haft-8 and Haft-9 missiles risk inadvertent escalation because of their 
dual capabilities.  
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Chapter 7 
  
Four Pathways to Nuclear First Use  
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This chapter culminates the analysis provided in the previous chapters. Each of the 
four scenarios outlined below, is informed by general escalation principles, predetermined 
elements, and major forces of change. Each scenario relies on a different general escalation 
principle, but many overlaps can also be observed. The scenarios are divided into Pakistan as 
the crisis initiator and India as the crisis initiator, and then subsequently subdivided into 
Pakistan as the nuclear first user and India as the nuclear first user. It is important to keep in 
mind that “to argue that a war could start in this way is not to claim that this is the only or 
even the most likely path to war.”293  Rather each of these scenarios is possible and therefore 
worth consideration. By imagining the ways in which India and Pakistan may escalate the 
Kashmir conflict to the nuclear level, we can better understand the aspects of Indo-Pakistani 
relations that are especially escalatory for the region. We will present the scenarios in the 
order described in the typology below.  
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Scenario One: Pakistan Initiator and First User  
Jaipur, India: November 8, 2025:   
On the third day of Diwali, three terrorists opened fire at the Johari Bazaar, killing 40 
Indians celebrating the Festival of Lights. The attack took place only a few days following 
confusion along the LOC, when Pakistan and Indian army forces exchanged fire following an 
Indian attempt to repair fence infrastructure in the Poonch/Rawalakot section of Kashmir.294 
An Indian UAV, capturing images of the border fence, crossed over the LOC into Azad 
Kashmir and was subsequently shot down. India responded with cross-border shelling that 
resulted in the death of one Pakistani soldier. Following the events of November 8th, India 
relegates blame for the Diwali attacks to LeT, a terrorist organization operating in Pakistani 
administered Kashmir.295 New Delhi makes a public statement demanding Pakistan “take 
responsibility for the deaths of the 40 murdered civilians and take swift action to punish 
LeT’s leadership.” Islamabad responds with a condemnation of all terrorism and a promise to 
punish those responsible, but denies any responsibility for the “unfortunate events of 
November 8.”296 Pakistan then demands an Indian apology for the death of the Pakistani 
soldier killed at his post in Rawalakot two days prior. New Delhi is outraged by the 
suggestion and continues issuing rhetoric promising punitive action for Pakistan’s refusal to 
quell cross border terrorism.  
 Indian citizens take to the streets two days later in Delhi, Jaipur, and New Delhi 
demanding the government stop coddling Pakistan and avenge the deaths of the Diwali attack 
victims.297 Indian nationalism seems to be at an all-time high and feeling pressure from 
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below, New Delhi mobilizes its II Corps in Ambala to the international border where the 
Pakistani and Indian Punjab meet. Within 72 hours India’s II Corps crosses the international 
border into Pakistani Punjab about 20 miles.298 Pakistan moves its 18 Army divisions into 
forward deployed positions around the Indian incursion in Pakistani Punjab region, preparing 
for conventional confrontation with India. Pakistan relies on its natural defense fortifications 
and hopes India does not expand the scope of its incursion further into Pakistani territory, 
fearing for the safety of its citizens in the city of Lahore, only a few miles from the area of 
confrontation.  
Pakistan responds to the cross-border incursion, stating “any move by India to expand 
the scope of its foolish endeavor into our state will be seen as a threat to our sovereignty, the 
ultimate provocation deserving of an ultimate weapon response.”299 Indian and Pakistani 
militaries clash in Pakistani Punjab for three days straight, with no signs that India plans on 
expanding the scope of the conflict. Both sides desperately search for some diplomatic face-
saving event to deescalate the situation,300 but quite the opposite comes in the following days. 
Islamabad amps up its nuclear rhetoric, more overtly expressing its nuclear redlines stating, 
“If India encroaches into our territory any further Pakistan will have no choice but to employ 
our nuclear arsenal. The international community must understand we have no choice in the 
face of this blatant Indian aggression.”301 New Delhi expresses publicly its intentions to keep 
the conflict limited in nature stating, “We hold no intention to expand the scope of this 
conflict with Pakistan. India will continue to occupy the border area of Pakistani Punjab until 
Islamabad takes real punitive action regarding the terrorists harbored in Pakistani Kashmir.”  
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India is able to bite and hold the territory in Pakistani Punjab for two weeks. De-
escalation seems nowhere in sight, with the UN as well as many nations such as the United 
States encouraging restraint, but showing little interest in leading mediation efforts.302 New 
Delhi considers its surgical strike a success, as Pakistan seems paralyzed to do anything other 
than hold defenses without sufficient conventional offensive power. Pakistan fears India will 
expand the scope of the conflict further into Pakistani territory and begins plans to deploy the 
Haft-8 Nasr missile into the battlefield in an effort to make its nuclear deterrent more 
credible.  
With the Pakistani military humiliation ongoing in Punjab, a fateful tactical decision 
by an Indian military general triggers catastrophe. Ten days after the initial Indian 
mobilization to Punjab, an Indian military general, acting in his autonomous role on the 
battlefield sees a window of opportunity to make the Indian position in Punjab more 
advantageous.303 Facing continuous shelling from Pakistanis hidden by natural defense 
fortifications, the general sees an opportunity to push the Pakistani forces back slightly so 
that a natural barrier will protect the Indian position. The II Corps advances only one mile 
deeper into Pakistani territory, but nonetheless in the direction of Lahore.304  
Islamabad is alarmed by the movements in the field and fears India plans to march 
further forward either threatening Lahore or to sever the small country in two. Islamabad’s 
military establishment sees the threat as inevitable.305 Facing few options conventionally, as 
evidenced by India’s 10 day hold on Pakistani territory, Islamabad launches its tactical 
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nuclear weapon, the Haft-8 Nasr missile at Indian forces along the border of Punjab.306 
Islamabad calculates the risk of an Indian nuclear counter-response may be mitigated by the 
use of the Nasr within Pakistan’s own borders. The Kashmir conflict has officially escalated 
to the nuclear level.  
Scenario Two: Pakistan Initiator, India First User  
Chengdu, China: December 10, 2025   
Islamabad and Beijing conclude the signing of the 2025 Sino-Pakistani Defense 
Treaty on December 10, 2025 in Chengdu, China. The finalization of the defense treaty 
followed a decade long period of Sino-Pakistani cooperation in defense equipment transfers, 
intelligence sharing, and bilateral army and naval exercises.307 The Chengdu Defense Pact 
basically formalizes the ongoing cooperation between the two nations, although it is vital to 
know that Beijing makes no overt commitment to defend Pakistan in the case of war.  
The increased Sino-Pakistani cooperation parallels an intensification in US-Indian 
defense collaboration, beginning with the US-Indian civilian nuclear deal in 2008 and 
culminating in the 2020 bilateral agreement between the nations, promising the organization 
of annual military exercises in India. India’s warming relations with the United States allows 
New Delhi to expedite its modernization of its defensive and offensive capabilities. Analyst 
believe the newly invigorated US-Indian defense commitments worsened the conventional 
balance on the continent, creating a security trilemma, which ultimately pushed the People’s 
Republic of China and Pakistan into more formal defense agreements. 308 
On January 10th, exactly one month after the signing of the Chengdu Defense Pact, 
India launches an army exercise in the Northern region of Indian state of Uttarakhand, close 
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to the International Border with China. New Delhi fails to alert either Islamabad or Beijing 
prior to the army exercises. 309 The timing of the exercises seems to be a direct response to 
the singing of the Chengdu Defense Pact: a way for India to flex its military power to both 
bordering nations.  
Chinese response comes in the following days with increased firing across the Line of 
Actual Control separating Indian controlled Kashmir and Aksai Chin. Pakistan, feeling 
emboldened by China’s defense commitments,310 and seeing a window of opportunity as 
India refocuses its defense apparatus to face the Chinese threat escalating along the LAC,311 
decides it is now or never to make real strides in changing the status quo in Kashmir.312 On 
January 14 Pakistan conducts heavy artillery shelling across the LOC unexpectedly at the 
Kotli/Rajouri posts.313 Under the cover of heavy shelling and the reduced visibility common 
for Kashmiri winters314, Azad Kashmir forces slip over the border into Indian controlled 
Kashmir through the neighboring Bhimber/Neaushera sector where many of the Indian 
Border Security forces at that post have vacated their posts to rush into Rajouri in response to 
the artillery shelling there. The following morning New Delhi is alerted to violence within 
Kashmir and the killing of five Border Security agents.  
New Delhi, bogged down both along the LOC and the LAC, feels the strain on their 
conventional forces.315 New Delhi publicly states, “Our neighbors seem intent on disrupting 
the peace of our borders and bringing unrest to the Valley of Kashmir. The Pakistanis 
continue to violate the 2003 ceasefire in an effort to allow violence to spread throughout the 
                                                        
309 Major Forces of Change 4.4  
310 Major Forces of Change 6.4 
311 Major Forces of Change 6.3 
312 Major Forces of Change 4.1 
313 Predetermined Element 4.8 
314 Jacob, Line on Fire, 94.  
315 Predetermined Element 5.4 
 105 
Valley for their own selfish revisionist aims. India will continue to meet the threats on our 
borders and the insurgents from within with the utmost confidence in our military 
establishment.” India’s response in Kashmir and along the LAC and LOC is restrained. India 
approves a vertical escalation along the LOC and LAC for the use of cross-border artillery 
shelling, but makes no moves to mobilize its army to the border. Furthermore, India meets 
the insurgency in Indian controlled Kashmir by sending more troops into the Valley, but the 
insurgency seems to be dying down and Kashmiri civilians do not seem to be answering the 
call of Azad Kashmir forces to “take up arms against their Hindu oppressors.” Despite the 
strain India is facing, fighting a three-front offensive (along the LOC, the LAC, and within 
Kashmir), escalation seems unlikely and unwanted. The People’s Republic of China remains 
silent on the issue of Kashmir, neither condemning Pakistani aggression nor communicating 
support.  
Indian calculations change on January 21st when unrest and violence break out in the 
streets of Chandigarh, the state capital of the fragile Indian state of Punjab. Indian 
intelligence finds Azad Kashmir forces not only crossed the LOC, but continued into Indian 
Punjab where the forces successfully incited violence. New Delhi lividly condemns Pakistan 
for “attempting to destabilize Punjab” and claims the violence in the Punjab is the work of 
“external actors supported by the Pakistani state.”316 Islamabad claims the unrest in Punjab is 
a result of “India’s own poor governance” and denies any Pakistani involvement in the 
insurgency. New Delhi, fearing the spread of insurgency to other regions of India, develops a 
plan to fight a two-pronged assault in response to Sino-Pakistani aggressions along 
Kashmir’s borders. India focuses its ground forces on China, mobilizing troops to the LAC, 
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while simultaneously conducting secret bilateral talks with Chinese diplomats. The 
mobilization is catalyst enough to lead both nations to pursue conflict de-escalation. India’s 
strategy vis a vis Pakistan takes on a more aggressive tone,317 partly due to the strain India 
feels with ground forces postured toward China. The IAF conducts air strikes on targets 
within Pakistani controlled Kashmir, as well as sites within Pakistan suspected of training 
Azad Kashmir forces. Islamabad decries the strikes as “unprovoked,” still upholding the 
narrative that the events in Kashmir and Punjab are the work of “self-motivated insurgents.” 
Islamabad declares “Pakistan has no reservations about using any weapon in our arsenal to 
respond to India’s blatantly unprovoked aggressions.”318   
Two days following the IAF strikes, Pakistan employs its air force to conduct several 
strikes on military targets, including on India’s Defense Laboratory in Jodhpur, Rajasthan 
where chemical production takes place. The consequences are shocking and devastating with 
hundreds of Indians in Jodhpur killed or injured by the release of toxic gas cloud. Despite the 
conventional nature of the attack, New Delhi considers the effect of the attack on its chemical 
facility deserving of a nuclear counter-response.319 In line with New Delhi’s exceptions to its 
NFU policy, the Nuclear Command Authority gives approval for a nuclear strike on Pakistan 
and utilizes the Jaguar IS/IB aircraft to deliver nuclear gravity bombs on Pakistani military 
targets, killing thousands of Pakistanis in neighboring cities. The nuclear strike in response to 
the “chemical weapons attack,” officially makes the war a nuclear one. Pakistan 
inadvertently escalates the crisis with India through its conventional attack on India’s 
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chemical facility and India responds with nuclear escalation. The Kashmir issue ultimately 
initiated an alteration of India’s NFU and moved the region into a nuclear war. 
Scenario Three: India Initiator, Pakistan First User  
Sialkot, Pakistan/Jammu, India: March 19, 2025  
 
India conducts heavy shelling across the IB/WB320 in the Sialkot/Jammu sector, 
resulting in the deaths of 6 civilians on the Pakistani-side of Kashmir on March 19.321 The 
shelling followed a visit from UNMOGIP, requesting the release of information regarding 
Indian Ceasefire Violations that occurred the previous month. India refused to cooperate with 
UNMOGIP, considering its legitimacy as null.322 Islamabad used the event as an opportunity 
to frame itself as the “victim” in the Kashmir conflict, appealing to several governments, 
including the United States, to “help Pakistan restore the authority of UNMOGIP along the 
LOC/WB” and to “support the relegation of the Kashmir question to the UN Security 
Council.”323 Pakistan’s attempts to relegate the Kashmir question to the UN Security Council 
are met with silence, as members including the United States, Russia, and China attempt to 
stay neutral with regard to the Kashmir dispute.324  
The UNMOGIP issues a report in the following weeks, condemning the increase in 
Indian Ceasefire Violations over the past month and Pakistan misinterprets this report as a 
tacit approval of the Pakistani stake in the Kashmir conflict.325 Islamabad, feeling confident 
in its standing with the United Nations, conducts a land grab in the Jammu side of Indian 
controlled Kashmir, where India has been conducting heavy artillery shelling. New Delhi 
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declares the land grab of April 12 is “the most blatant Pakistani ceasefire violation committed 
along the IB since Kargil,” and that like the events of 1999 “the violation is tantamount to an 
act of war.” India mobilizes its I and XXI Corps to the international border, specifically 
moving the XXI Corps into position in Gujarat, to threaten the International Border at the 
Rann of Kutch. Although New Delhi hoped to achieve tactical surprise with a surgical strike 
into the southernmost region of Pakistan, the large troop formations give Indian location 
away and Pakistan prepares to meet the threat to their border.326 The XXI corps moves as far 
as 150 miles into Pakistani territory in the Sindh province before meeting the natural 
fortification created by the Nara Canal. The Pakistani Army is prepared for the encounter and 
the natural defense fortifications provided by the Nara Canal give Pakistan the upper hand.  
In the following three days India is pushed further and further back from their 
position below the Nara Canal, meanwhile, the international community begs the two sides 
“to act rationally” and “step back from the brink.” New Delhi and Islamabad hold secret 
secretary-level talks aimed at de-escalation, but neither side seems ready to compromise. 
Islamabad’s diplomat demands a reconsideration of the Kashmir issue with any peace 
settlement, whereas India refuses to “reject the legitimacy of the 1972 Simla Agreement,” 
which established the LOC.   
It seems the Indian position is dwindling more and more every day and any chance at 
a favorable ceasefire agreement is diminishing with each mile Pakistan pushes India back. 
New Delhi feels pressure to avoid a humiliating defeat at the hand of the Pakistanis, 
considering the gross investments made over the last decade in military modernization 
programs and the pressure of adversaries like China watching from the sidelines. New Delhi 
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decides it needs a swift victory to draw Pakistan to the negotiating table on favorable 
terms.327 One victory and ceasefire agreements could be politically face-saving for the Indian 
administration. On April 17, four days after Indian mobilization to Pakistan’s Sindh 
province, the army commands the IAF to conduct joint operations with the Indian ground 
troops, supplying aerial cover to forces attempting to regain ground up to the Nara Canal.328  
 The IAF overreaches its aerial support role, contravening Indian Army commands to 
keep the strikes limited to below the Nara Canal. At the 20th hour of April 17, 2025, the IAF 
crosses the Nara Canal, releasing heavy fire beyond the point delimitated by the Indian 
Army.329 Islamabad is shocked by the events and becomes warry that New Delhi is nervously 
escalating to hastily win the war.330 Islamabad is especially concerned about both the 
expansion of India’s so-called “limited” surgical strike and the vertical escalation to air 
power. Despite confusion between the Indian army and the Indian Air Force, ground troops 
successfully re-occupy areas close to the Nara Canal that India lost over the past week. 
Islamabad is convinced India plans to continue expanding the geographic scope of the war 
and fears for its cities in close proximity to the area of conflict, including Mirpur Khas and 
Hyderabad. Pakistan deploys its Haft-8 nuclear missile to the Nara Canal and utilizes the 
nuclear weapon in the battlefield. The Kashmir conflict transitions from low intensity 
conflict to nuclear war when Pakistan’s nuclear rhetoric becomes a nuclear reality with the 
use of the Haft-8 missile for warfighting purposes.  
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Scenario Four: India Initiator and First User  
New Delhi, India: July 6, 2025 
The Indian Supreme Court passes a law weakening the autonomy of Indian controlled 
Kashmir.331 Article 35A332, brought before the Supreme Court first in February 2019, is 
deemed unconstitutional on discriminatory grounds and Kashmir loses its right to define the 
“permanent residents” of Kashmir and thereby confer special privileges to Kashmiri 
natives.333 Kashmiri people are outraged and people riot in the streets. India moves many 
troops in to quell the protest and over the next two days, Kashmir suffers many civilian 
casualties in a brutal Indian crackdown.  
Pakistan decries the events and promises to lend support to Kashmiri insurgents 
“fighting the good fight.”334 This overt statement of Pakistani support enrages New Delhi 
officials who warn Pakistan any disruption of the peace in Kashmir will be met with an 
aggressive response. Pakistan begins covertly supplying aid to Azad Kashmir forces 
infiltrating and intensifying the insurgency in Kashmir.335 New Delhi realizes Pakistani 
involvement amid an investigation that reveals Pakistani-supplied weapons are proliferating 
throughout Indian controlled Kashmir. The evidence of overt Pakistani involvement enrages 
New Delhi and escalates the crisis.336 New Delhi employs the Indian Air Force (IAF).337 The 
IAF crosses the LOC into Pakistani administered Kashmir then further into Pakistan, 
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conducting two consecutive air strikes in the sparsely populated Tharparkar district. 
Although the strikes were meant to be merely symbolic in nature, targeting a sparsely 
populated region of the Thar Dessert, the strikes result in the deaths of four Pakistani 
civilians. Islamabad, alarmed by the aerial cross border infiltration, asserts “Pakistan will not 
sit as India continues to commit human rights violations towards our Muslim brothers and 
sisters in Kashmir, nor will we idly watch as the IAF attacks innocent civilians.” Pakistan 
responds with air strikes of its own, conducted by the PAF in the Indian state of Rajasthan.  
New Delhi calls for a full mobilization of the Indian army and directs the IAF to 
continue its cross-border air strikes, this time targeting Pakistan’s military infrastructure. On 
July 20, only 14 days after the initiating incident, the IAF strikes Pakistan’s Air Base 
Samungli, killing several Pakistani air force pilots and destroying a considerable amount of 
Pakistani air power. Specifically, the attack destroys several dual capable Mirage III and 
Mirage V aircrafts. Islamabad worries India is attempting to destroy its nuclear delivery 
vehicles prior to an Indian conventional attack in order to diminish the deterrent power of 
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.338339 Islamabad publicly states, “India’s actions over the past two 
weeks, especially the attack on Samungli Air Base, have confirmed our suspicions that not 
only does India intend to violate the Simla Agreement, but also to violate Pakistani 
sovereignty. We are not afraid to take any action necessary to protect our citizens and India 
should be fully aware that strategically Pakistan is not hurt by the attack on Samungli. We 
still possess a great nuclear arsenal, capable of catastrophic damage. We hope India will not 
force our hand.”340 
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Indian troops reach the international border and New Delhi declares “We fear the 
region is headed for war, but we do not fear the enemy. India is more than prepared to fight 
our reckless adversary for stability on the continent. India and Kashmir have suffered long 
enough with Pakistani meddling.” The following day Pakistan forward deploys its road 
mobile Nasr missile to the border.341 Indian intelligence identifies the weapon and alerts 
strategic planners in New Delhi. India, fearing Pakistan will use its forward deployed tactical 
nuclear weapon in a debilitating strike, uses its short range Prahaar Brahmos missile342 to 
take out the weapon in a preemptive strike along the border of Pakistan and Pakistani 
administered Kashmir.343 India’s calculation that Pakistan may use a nuclear weapon out of 
fear of an Indian conventional attack leads India to take the Kashmir crisis to the nuclear 
level.344 
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Chapter 8: 
 
Policy Implications of the Pathways  
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The four pathways to nuclear first-use illuminate parts of the Indo-Pakistani strategic 
relationship that are especially escalatory. This thesis argued that the first-use of a nuclear 
weapon by Pakistan or India could result from rational decisions by policy makers and that 
there is a serious possibility of the Kashmir conflict escalating to the nuclear level. Through 
my analysis of Indian and Pakistani military and nuclear doctrine, I have shown that not only 
are the two nations moving towards doctrines that envisage nuclear weapons as warfighting 
instruments, but also that both nations are pursuing conventional strategies likely to intensify 
tensions concerning Kashmir. The four scenarios can help policy makers and scholars to 
conceptualize how the particularly escalatory aspects of Indian and Pakistani military/nuclear 
doctrines could work in tandem to create something of a perfect storm for nuclear war.  
 In the first scenario, I described how Pakistani-sponsored terrorist groups might begin 
a war that Pakistan would be responsible for fighting. The concurrence of terrorist attacks 
and heightened levels of ceasefire violations may move the low intensity conflict in Kashmir 
from the subconventional level to a conventional Indo-Pakistani war. Other important 
takeaways from Scenario One include the amplification of Indian nationalism, leading to a 
more aggressive response from New Delhi, as well as the activation of an Indian Cold Start 
operation. The first scenario highlighted the flaws of fighting a “limited” war with Pakistan 
and the positive correlation between Indian officer autonomy and the threat of conflict 
escalation. Finally, the first scenario illustrated how compound expectations may interact to 
push Pakistan to employ a nuclear weapon. In the Indo-Pakistani strategic relationship, 
compound expectations should be of particular concern to policy makers because the South 
Asian adversaries lack the substantive bilateral cooperation and early warning systems 
necessary to deescalate crises. The United States administration should be especially wary of 
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the possibility for India and Pakistan to misinterpret the other’s intentions and, therefore, 
should bridge the communication gap between the nations in crises. Scenario One exposes 
the importance of third-party governments in alleviating the nervousness of Islamabad and 
New Delhi, thereby evading the risk of compound expectations.  
 The Second Scenario, emphasized the growing security trilemma in Southeast Asia 
and how Chinese involvement may further destabilize the Kashmir situation. Important 
escalatory measures played out in Scenario Two include the formalization of a Sino-Pakistani 
defense alliance, the flexing of Indian military might, the closing of a window of opportunity 
to change the Kashmiri status quo, and growth of insurgency within Kashmir. Vital to 
Scenario Two is the role of compound escalation, whereby India feels especially threatened 
by the expansion of insurgency into sensitive Indian states. United States diplomats must 
understand the Indian state’s sensitivity to internal unrest, in order to fully comprehend the 
escalatory potential of Pakistani compound escalation measures. U.S. efforts to manage 
Pakistani crises should address the importance of geographically containing the conflict. 
Finally, the aggressive Pakistani response to New Delhi’s air power, reveals both the 
Pakistani sensitivity to the IAF and the possibility for Indian exceptions to NFU. Scenario 
Two raises important questions about when and why Indian NFU would breakdown.  
In Scenario Three, a ceasefire violation across the LOC surpasses the nuclear 
threshold, following several escalatory steps. An important takeaway from Scenario Three 
includes the power of escalation rhetoric, specifically nuclear rhetoric, in motivating the two 
adversaries to act. Other key actions that intensify Scenario Three include the conduct of 
cross-border infiltrations by the Indian Army, the disjuncture between Indian military 
branches, and the difficulty in keeping a ‘limited’ incursion limited. The third scenario 
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highlighted how a fairly common low-level conflict technique (UAV missions across the 
LOC) could turn catastrophic quickly. The international community may have resigned itself 
to accepting low-level violence within Kashmir as the status quo, but United States planners 
should pay special attention to these seemingly “insignificant” cross border violations. As 
scenario four revealed, low-level violence has the potential to quickly spiral into nuclear war.  
 Finally, in Scenario Four, I emphasize the importance of the Kashmiri domestic scene 
in shaping Indo-Pakistan relations. Through judicial ruling, the ongoing question of Kashmiri 
autonomy plunges India and Pakistan into war with one another. The domestic politics of 
Kashmir present fertile ground for another Indo-Pakistani war. South Asian experts and 
policy makers should recognize the potential for war beginning with a political act and not 
just military actions. Heightened political tensions are plausible drivers for Indo-Pakistani 
escalation. Other significant characteristics of Scenario Four include overt Pakistani support 
for Kashmiri insurgents, counterforce targeting by the IAF, and the use of dual capable 
Pakistani aircraft. Scenario Four brings to light the risk of inadvertent escalation and how it 
may contribute to nuclear first-use in Southeast Asia. Scenario four has important policy 
implications for the United States, specifically with regard to U.S. weapons collaboration and 
sales with India and Pakistan. The United States should take a special interest in ensuring 
both India and Pakistan avoid the use of dual capable weaponry and dissuade large-scale 
counterforce targeting. In an environment brimming with the potential for spiral escalation, 
the United States should carefully craft a policy forbidding the sale of dual capabilities to 
India and Pakistan, while encouraging other nations like China and Russia to do the same.  
 In sum, each of the four scenarios should inform U.S. policy concerning future crises 
in Kashmir. The four scenarios provide early warning indicators of potential nuclear 
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escalation, allowing policy makers the intelligence to pursue informed conflict management 
diplomacy in Kashmir.  
 With a careful consideration of how a nuclear war may begin over the complicated 
region of Kashmir, planners at all levels in India and Pakistan can make decisions more 
informed about the strategic-level consequences they possess. Some scholars may argue an 
in-depth illustration of what could happen is merely make-believe or even that nuclear 
weapons have merely deterrent capabilities, but I have shown here how scenario planning 
reveals the very rational ways in which a conflict in Kashmir can escalate. Furthermore, 
those who believe Indian or Pakistani nuclear first-use is outside the realm of plausibility rely 
heavily on the assumption that because an event has not occurred it therefore will never 
occur. The implications of this passivity regarding nuclear deterrence is incredibly dangerous 
and encourages reckless behaviors within the international community. Each of the four 
pathways to nuclear war over Kashmir lack an active 3rd party mediator, therefore, 
highlighting the dangers of a passive international community. I argue not that nuclear first-
use in Kashmir will happen, but rather that it could. Admitting that nuclear war is within the 
realm of plausibility for the Kashmir conflict is the first step in forming informed policy 
decisions to deescalate Indo-Pakistani crises. By understanding which parts of the Indo-
Pakistani relationship are most escalatory, we may move forward in unshrouding the nuclear 
shadow that looms over the valleys and hills of Kashmir.  
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